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INTRODUCTION 
“Transferred intent” is a familiar doctrine of tort law—familiar, at least, to the 
many law students who have an assignment on transferred intent in their torts course 
and must attempt to understand it for the final examination.1 As with so much else in 
American tort law, the most prominent doctrinal writing on the subject is that of 
William Prosser. Each edition of Prosser’s Law of Torts treatise contained a section 
on transferred intent,2 and he wrote the first law review article devoted to the subject.3 
In the nearly half century since its publication in 1967, there have been only three 
other substantial articles on transferred intent in tort law—two published in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 † Copyright © 2016 Peter B Kutner. 
 * Hugh Roff Professor of Law, The University of Oklahoma. The author expresses 
appreciation for the research assistance of Kimber Shoop, the insights of University of 
Oklahoma colleagues Bill McNichols, Mac Reynolds, and Murray Tabb, and the facilities 
provided by the Meijers Institute of Leiden University and the Max Planck Institute for 
Comparative and International Private Law. 
 1. See Vincent R. Johnson, Transferred Intent in American Tort Law, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 
903, 903 n.1 (2004) (citing numerous torts casebooks with material on transferred intent). 
 2. In the last edition written by Prosser: WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW 
OF TORTS 32–34 (4th ed. 1971). Further references to Prosser’s treatise in this Article are to 
this edition. An edition of the treatise prepared by others after Prosser’s death also contains a 
section on transferred intent. W. PAGE KEETON, DAN B. DOBBS, ROBERT E. KEETON & 
DAVID G. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 37–39 (W. Page Keeton 
ed., 5th ed. 1984). 
 3. William L. Prosser, Transferred Intent, 45 TEX. L. REV. 650 (1967).  
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United States4 and one in England.5 None of the three focuses on whether Prosser’s 
interpretation of the law was correct. 
By the time Prosser was writing on transferred intent, the first Restatement of 
Torts had endorsed liability for battery and assault based on transferred intent. Under 
the “black letter” rules of the Restatement, a defendant could be held liable for battery 
if the defendant acted with intent to commit an assault (apprehension of harmful or 
offensive contact to a person) and liable for assault if the defendant acted with intent 
to commit a battery (harmful or offensive contact to a person). Also, a defendant 
could be liable to a plaintiff for battery or assault if the defendant’s intent was to 
cause a battery or assault to a different person.6 The Restatement (Second) of Torts 
contained substantially the same provisions.7 American courts have generally 
accepted these rules. 
But Prosser went further in his article on transferred intent. He claimed that a 
person could be held liable for an intentional tort on the basis of transferred intent if 
the person intended to cause anything that was within the old common law trespass 
action and the result was also within the common law trespass action.8 Thus, a person 
could be held liable for battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to chattels, or 
trespass to land if the person’s intent was to cause any one of the five torts.9 This 
proposition was then added to the next edition of Prosser’s treatise10 and his 
casebook.11 If this is correct, a person who attempted to commit a battery or assault 
could be liable for trespass to land or trespass to chattels despite the absence of any 
intent to touch the plaintiff’s property. More seriously, a person whose intent was 
only to touch some property without a right to do so, such as throwing a rock at a 
tree, could be liable for battery if a person was accidentally touched, or for assault if 
there was apprehension of bodily contact. Intentional tort liability would be imposed 
on people who had no intent to cause anything resembling what the plaintiff 
complained of. 
The main theme of this Article is that Prosser advanced a mythical doctrine of 
transferred intent. What Prosser asserted to be the law was not the law when he wrote 
his article on transferred intent and amended his treatise. The cases he relied on to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 4. Johnson, supra note 1; Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Transferred Intent: Should Its 
“Curious Survival” Continue?, 50 OKLA. L. REV. 529 (1997). 
 5. Allan Beever, Transferred Malice in Tort Law?, 29 LEGAL STUD. 400 (2009). Perhaps 
the dearth of articles is because, in recent times, “[s]enior scholars would worry . . . about a 
junior colleague who proposed to write articles titled . . . ‘Transferred Intent.’” Anita 
Bernstein, The New-Tort Centrifuge, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 413, 428 (1999). 
 6. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 13, 16, 18, 20, 21, 32 (1934). 
 7. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 16, 18, 20, 21, 32 (1965). 
 8. See Prosser, supra note 3, at 655–56, 658–59.  
 9. See id. Prosser’s first statement of this was that when the defendant intended any of 
the first four of these torts, the defendant’s intention would be “transferred” to make him liable 
for any of the five. Id. at 655. But the discussion of trespass to land in the article indicates that 
an intent to commit a trespass to land would also qualify, and this is included in the description 
of transferred intent that appeared in the next editions of Prosser’s treatise and casebook. See 
PROSSER, supra note 2, at 33; WILLIAM L. PROSSER & YOUNG B. SMITH, CASES AND MATERIALS 
ON TORTS 34 (4th ed. 1967). 
 10. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 33. 
 11. PROSSER & SMITH, supra note 9, at 34. 
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support his conclusions on transferred intent did not support them. Moreover, despite 
Prosser’s great influence on American tort law, Prosser’s position on transferred 
intent is not the law now and should not be. Its consequences are undesirable. 
Recognition of transferred intent as a basis of liability is due primarily to its inclusion 
in the First and Second Restatements of Torts. Transferred intent does not and should 
not extend beyond the Restatements’ rules. 
I. THE CONCEPT OF TRANSFERRED INTENT 
As the name implies, an “intentional tort” is a tort that has intent as an element of 
liability.12 A person must have acted with a certain intent in order to be liable. Under 
the old common law that prevailed until the nineteenth century, there was sufficient 
intent for trespass liability if a person engaged in an intentional act, such as throwing 
an object or driving a vehicle. There was no requirement that the person act with an 
intent to cause what happened to the plaintiff or any other specific consequence.13 
But the modern intentional torts require for liability an intent to cause a certain type 
of result. Usually this means that the defendant acted with the purpose or object of 
causing the result—for example, throwing a stone or firing a gun with the purpose of 
hitting a person or an animal. However, a defendant can also be considered to have 
intended a result if the defendant knew that his act was substantially certain to cause 
the result.14 
As a general rule, intentional tort liability requires that the defendant have 
intended the type of interference with the plaintiff’s legally protected interests that is 
the basis of the plaintiff’s claim.15 Thus, liability for battery requires that the 
defendant act with an intent to cause a harmful or offensive bodily contact.16 Liability 
for assault requires that the defendant act with an intent to cause apprehension of an 
imminent harmful or offensive bodily contact.17 Liability for false imprisonment 
requires an intent to confine a person.18 Liability for trespass to chattels requires an 
intent to physically “intermeddle” with a chattel.19 Liability for trespass to land 
requires an intent to cause an entry into another’s land.20 
                                                                                                                 
 
 12. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1717 (10th ed. 2014).  
 13. See infra Part II.  
 14. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL HARM 
§ 1 (2005); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965); 1 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN 
& ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF TORTS 73–75 (2d ed. 2011); James A. Henderson, Jr. & 
Aaron D. Twerski, Intent and Recklessness in Tort: The Practical Craft of Restating Law, 54 
VAND. L. REV. 1133, 1138–39 (2001). 
 15. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 34–35; Jerome J. Atrens, Intentional Interference 
with the Person, in STUDIES IN CANADIAN TORT LAW 378, 379–83 (Allen M. Linden ed., 1968); 
Anthony J. Sebok, Purpose, Belief, and Recklessness: Pruning the Restatement (Third)’s 
Definition of Intent, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1165, 1168–69 (2001). 
 16. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18 (1965). 
 17. Id. § 21. 
 18. Id. § 35. 
 19. Id. § 217. 
 20. Id. § 158. 
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“Transferred intent” extends liability by allowing an action for an intentional tort 
when the defendant had an intent to cause something different than the result of the 
defendant’s act. There are actually two types of transferred intent that may create 
intentional tort liability for an unintended result. The first might be described as 
“third-party transferred intent.” It treats a defendant’s intent to cause a certain result 
to one person as sufficient for liability when the defendant’s act causes the intended 
type of result but to a different person. The classic transferred intent case is that in 
which the defendant intended to strike A’s body but caused B to be hit. The 
defendant’s intent to strike A fulfills the intent requirement of battery liability if B 
sues the defendant for battery. The defendant can therefore be liable to B for battery 
even though the defendant had no intent to cause a battery to B.21 In a sense, the law 
transfers to B the defendant’s intent to cause a battery to A, hence the label 
“transferred intent.”22 However, the defendant would be liable for battery to A as 
well as to B if the defendant’s act caused both to be hit.23 This type of transferred 
intent could also apply to other intentional torts. The Restatement of Torts endorses 
liability for false imprisonment when the defendant intended to confine someone 
other than the person who was confined24 and liability for assault when the defendant 
intended someone other than the plaintiff to be put in apprehension of imminent 
battery.25 
The second type of transferred intent treats an intent to cause a certain result as 
sufficient for intentional tort liability when the defendant’s act caused a different type 
of result. The classic case of this nature is that of the defendant who intended a 
harmful or offensive bodily contact—that is, a battery—but whose act caused 
apprehension of such a contact. (The intended battery might have occurred 
immediately after the unintended apprehension.) The defendant’s intent to commit a 
battery fulfills the intent requirement of liability for assault.26 Conversely, the 
defendant who intended to cause only apprehension of harmful or offensive bodily 
contact—for example, a defendant who wanted to intimidate a person by firing a gun 
in the person’s direction—but caused an actual harmful or offensive bodily contact 
is subject to liability for battery. The defendant’s intent to commit an assault fulfills 
the intent requirement for a battery action.27 The second type of transferred intent 
would be better described as “interchangeable intent.” The intent requirements of 
battery and assault have become interchangeable in the sense that the defendant’s 
intent to cause either one supplies the intent requirement of liability for both torts.28 
                                                                                                                 
 
 21. Id. §§ 13, 16, 18, 20.  
 22. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 14, at 116. 
 23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 20 cmt. b (1965). 
 24. Id. §§ 35, 43. 
 25. Id. §§ 21, 32. 
 26. See id. 
 27. Id. §§ 13, 16, 18, 20. 
 28. Alan Calnan, in Anomalies in Intentional Tort Law, 1 TENN. J.L. & POL’Y 187, 209 
n.47 (2005), contended that there is no need for “transfer” of intent when the intent 
requirement for a tort action is defined to include an intent to commit another tort. However, 
the essence of what is conventionally described as transferred intent is the defendant having 
the intent necessary to be liable for an intentional tort because of an intent to cause a different 
tort or the same tort to a different person. See Heidi M. Hurd & Michael S. Moore, Negligence 
2016] THE PROSSER MYTH OF TRANSFERRED INTENT 1109 
 
This Article is primarily concerned with the second type of transferred intent 
(interchangeable intent) and whether transferred intent extends beyond battery and 
assault to include all of the intentional torts that developed from the old common law 
trespass action. Prosser asserted that it did. Thus, an intent to cause a trespass to land 
or chattels could supply the intent requirement in a battery action and vice versa. This 
Article will contend that Prosser’s assertion was erroneous and that it should not be 
accepted in modern tort law. 
II. TRANSFERRED INTENT IN PREMODERN LAW 
The origins of tort law are found primarily in the common law actions of trespass 
and “trespass on the case.” Neither action required any intent on the part of the 
defendant to cause damage or other interference with the plaintiff’s interests.29 An 
action on the case was maintainable when damage was caused by legally wrongful 
conduct—for example, negligence, nuisance, or slander.30 A trespass action was 
maintainable when the defendant’s act caused a physical interference with the 
plaintiff’s person or property that was “direct” or “immediate.” Interference was 
considered direct or immediate when it resulted from a “force” set in motion by the 
defendant’s act.31 While this included acts intended to cause physical contact with 
the plaintiff’s person or property, it also included acts such as throwing an object,32 
firing a gun,33 or driving a horse-drawn vehicle34 done with no such intent, but which 
resulted in injury. In the famous case of Scott v. Shepherd,35 the defendant was held 
liable to a trespass action for having thrown a “lighted squib” that was thrown again 
by two persons in a market-house before it hit the plaintiff in the face and exploded. 
Despite the trespass action’s having no requirement that the defendant act with an 
intent to cause an injury or other wrongful consequence, Prosser claimed that 
transferred intent was a foundation of liability for trespass under the common law.36 
One basis for Prosser’s claim was that criminal law had developed a doctrine of 
transferred intent at a time when trespass was both a crime and a tort. The “proximity 
of the criminal law to the trespass action” and similarity of the fact situations 
                                                                                                                 
 
in the Air, 3 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 333, 389 (2002) (contending that the doctrine of 
transferred intent cannot be dispensed with if there is to be liability on the basis of intentional 
wrongdoing). 
 29. FLEMING’S THE LAW OF TORTS 23–25 (Carolyn Sappideen & Prue Vines eds., 10th ed. 
2011); PROSSER, supra note 2, at 28–29. 
 30. LEWIS N. KLAR, TORT LAW 28 (5th ed. 2012). See generally A.K. KIRALFY, THE 
ACTION ON THE CASE (1951). 
 31. FLEMING’S THE LAW OF TORTS, supra note 29, at 23–24; KLAR, supra note 30, at 
28–31; see Leame v. Bray, (1803) 102 Eng. Rep. 724 (K.B.), 3 East 593. 
 32. Scott v. Shepherd, (1773) 96 Eng. Rep. 525 (C.P.), 2 Wm. Bl. 892, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124, 
3 Wils. 403. 
 33. Dickenson v. Watson, (1682) 84 Eng. Rep. 1218 (K.B), Jones, T. 205; Weaver v. 
Ward, (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P.), Hobart 134. 
 34. Hall v. Fearnley, (1842) 114 Eng. Rep. 761, 3 Q.B. 919, 7 Jurist 61, 12 L.J.Q.B. 22; 
Leame, 102 Eng. Rep. 724, 3 East 593. 
 35. Scott, 96 Eng. Rep. 525, 2 Wm. Bl. 892, 95 Eng. Rep. 1124, 3 Wils. 403. 
 36. See PROSSER, supra note 2, at 32–33; Prosser, supra note 3, at 652–54. 
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explained transferred intent’s application to tort actions.37 Prosser also asserted38 that 
defendants had been held liable to a trespass action on the basis of transferred intent 
in Scott v. Shepherd and a second English case, James v. Campbell.39 
It is certainly true that there has long been a doctrine of transferred intent or 
“transferred malice” in criminal law. As early as the sixteenth century, a person who 
intended to kill A could be found guilty of murder when the result was the death of 
B.40 Blackstone wrote in his Commentaries: 
[I]f one shoots at A and misses him, but kills B, this is murder; because of 
the previous felonious intent, which the law transfers from one to the other. 
The same is the case, where one lays poison for A; and B, against whom 
the prisoner had no malicious intent, takes it, and it kills him . . . .41 
An intent to kill or wound A could also support a prosecution for unlawfully injuring 
B.42 However, it was recognized even earlier that an injured person’s claim for 
damages was not subject to the requirement of malice or wrongful state of mind that 
would apply to a criminal case.43 Something like transferred intent or transferred 
malice was necessary in order to prosecute a person who intended to cause death or 
injury to someone other than the actual victim.44 This was not necessary to liability 
for damages because there was no requirement of intent to cause harm. The defendant 
would be liable to an unintended victim in a trespass action irrespective of whether 
the defendant had any intent to cause harm, provided the injury was considered an 
immediate or direct consequence of the defendant’s act.45 
                                                                                                                 
 
 37. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 33; Prosser, supra note 3, at 654. 
 38. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 33; Prosser, supra note 3, at 654. 
 39. (1832) 172 Eng. Rep. 1015 (C.P.), 5 Car. & P. 372. 
 40. See A.J. Ashworth, Transferred Malice and Punishment for Unforeseen 
Consequences, in RESHAPING THE CRIMINAL LAW 77, 77–85 (P.R. Glazebrook ed., 1978); 
Douglas N. Husak, Transferred Intent, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 65, 65–66 
(1996); Peter Westen, The Significance of Transferred Intent, 7 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 321, 324–25 
(2013). 
 41. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 201 (1769). 
 42. Ashworth, supra note 40, at 77–85; Prosser, supra note 3, at 652–53; Reynolds, supra 
note 4, at 548–50. 
 43. Weaver v. Ward, (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P.), Hobart 134; Cuny v. Brugewode, 
(1506) Y.B. 21 Hen. 7, fol. 27, Trin., pl. 5 (Eng.), reprinted in JOHN BAKER, BAKER AND 
MILSOM SOURCES OF ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 359–60 (2d ed. 2010); Hulle v. Orynge (The 
Case of Thorns), (1466) Y.B. 6 Edw. 4, Mich., fol. 7, pl. 18 (Eng.), reprinted in BAKER, supra, 
at 369–73.  
 44. Arguably there was no need to adopt transferred intent, at least for crimes other than 
murder and manslaughter. An intent to cause anyone to suffer harm of the type that occurred 
may have been sufficient. But criminal liability would not extend to causing a harm of a 
different type not within the same crime. See ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. BOYCE, 
CRIMINAL LAW 921–26 (3d ed. 1982); GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW 125–37 (2d ed. 
1961); Ashworth, supra note 40; Hurd & Moore, supra note 28, at 387–89. 
 45. See Peter H. Mixon, Comment, Application of Transferred Intent to Cases of 
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, 15 PAC. L.J. 147, 154–57 (1983) (distinguishing 
felony and trespass cases). 
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It is for this reason, not transferred intent, that the defendants in Scott v. Shepherd 
(the “lighted squib” case) and James v. Campbell were held liable in trespass actions. 
In Scott v. Shepherd, the key judgment sustaining the plaintiff’s action is that of Chief 
Justice De Grey. He said, 
Trespass is an injury accompanied with force, for which an action of 
trespass vi et armis lies against the person from whom it is received. The 
question here is, whether the injury received by the plaintiff arises from 
the force of the original act of the defendant, or from a new force by a 
third person. . . . [T]he true question is, whether the injury is the direct 
and immediate act of the defendant . . . .46 
Chief Justice De Grey concluded that it was.47 The dissent of Justice Blackstone is 
founded on the opposite conclusion: the plaintiff’s injury was not immediate, as the 
squib had come to rest and been thrown twice again before striking the plaintiff.48 
Chief Justice De Grey and Justice Blackstone did not make any reference to what 
the defendant intended to be the result of his throwing the squib other than 
“indiscriminate” mischief.49 Neither did the other two judges, Justice Nares and 
Justice Gould, who emphasized the unlawfulness of the defendant’s act. Justice 
Nares distinguished a trespass action, in which the malus animus of a defendant was 
not to be alleged or taken into consideration, from a felony case, in which it was to 
be considered.50 Chief Justice De Grey did refer to a person being guilty of murder 
when an unintended victim was killed,51 and he said that “though criminal cases are 
no rule for civil ones, yet in trespass I think there is an analogy.”52 But he also said 
that “actions of trespass will lie for legal acts when they become trespasses by 
accident; as in the cases cited for cutting thorns, lopping of a tree, shooting at a mark, 
defending oneself by a stick which strikes another behind, &c.”53 
James v. Campbell54 is no more supportive of the proposition that transferred 
intent was a basis of common law trespass liability than Scott v. Shepherd. During a 
quarrel that involved a Mr. Paxon, the defendant struck the plaintiff in the face. The 
defendant may have intended to strike Paxon rather than the plaintiff. Counsel for 
the defendant, in his address to the jury, contended that the jury ought to give a 
verdict for the defendant if the defendant did not intentionally strike the plaintiff. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 46. Scott v. Shepherd, (1773) 96 Eng. Rep. 525, 528 (C.P.), 2 Wm. Bl. 892, 899 (De Grey, 
C.J.). The report of the case in 95 Eng. Rep. 1124, 1129, 3 Wils. 403, 411–12, has similar 
language. 
 47. 96 Eng. Rep. at 528–29, 2 Wm. Bl. at 899–900, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1129, 3 Wils. at 
412–13 (De Grey, C.J.). 
 48. 96 Eng. Rep. at 526–28, 2 Wm. Bl. at 894–98, 95 Eng. Rep. at 1127–28, 3 Wils. at 
409–10 (Blackstone, J., dissenting). 
 49. 96 Eng. Rep. at 528, 2 Wm. Bl, at 899 (De Grey, C.J.). 
 50. 95 Eng. Rep. at 1126–27, 3 Wils. at 407–08 (Nares, J.). 
 51. Id. at 1129, 3 Wils. at 412 (De Grey, C.J.). 
 52. 96 Eng. Rep. at 528, 2 Wm. Bl. at 899 (De Grey, C.J.). 
 53. Id. The report of the case in 95 Eng. Rep. at 1129, 3 Wils. at 411, has similar language. 
 54. (1832) 172 Eng. Rep. 1015 (C.P.), 5 Car. & P. 372. 
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Justice Bosanquet instructed the jury that if the defendant struck the plaintiff, the 
plaintiff was entitled to their verdict “whether it was done intentionally or not.”55 
The brief report of the case gives no reason at all for this instruction. But it is very 
likely that the premise of the instruction was that an action for trespass to the person 
required no intent on the defendant’s part to strike anyone. Justice Bosanquet was 
probably aware of Leame v. Bray,56 which was decided after Scott v. Shepherd. 
Leame v. Bray is a road accident case in which the principal issue was whether a 
trespass action could lie when the injury was not caused wilfully. The court decided 
that a trespass action was maintainable. Lord Ellenborough, citing examples of 
accidental injuries that were trespasses, declared that “[i]f the injurious act be the 
immediate result of the force originally applied by the defendant, and the plaintiff be 
injured by it, it is the subject of an action of trespass vi et armis by all the cases both 
ancient and modern. It is immaterial whether the injury be wilful or not.”57 
James v. Campbell is a case with facts that would come within transferred intent 
in modern law if the defendant intended to strike Paxon rather than the plaintiff, and 
the defendant in Scott v. Shepherd may have intended the lighted squib to hit a person 
or a stand in the market-house. But the fact the defendants were held liable for 
trespass actions does not imply that transferred intent was a basis of liability in these 
cases. No intent to cause someone or something to be struck, or any other effect on 
a person or property, was required for liability. Under the common law, defendants 
were subject to trespass liability when there was no such intent—when their acts 
caused a harm or wrong that was regarded as immediate.58 In this the common law 
is fundamentally inconsistent with modern intentional tort law, which requires (for 
the torts referenced by Prosser) that the defendant have acted with the intent of 
causing a consequence to another’s property or person.59 For this reason, the cases 
cited by Prosser and the law of trespass under the common law pleading system 
cannot support the conclusion that transferred intent operates in modern intentional 
tort law. 
Prosser’s Transferred Intent article60 and his treatise61 suggested but discounted 
another possible basis in the common law for the operation of transferred intent: 
[A] defendant whose act had directly caused bodily harm to another was 
prima facie liable as a trespasser unless he could exculpate himself by 
showing that the harm resulted from inevitable accident. To do this he 
was required to show that he was innocent of fault, and it would be 
natural to regard it as impossible for him to do this if his conduct was 
                                                                                                                 
 
 55. Id. at 1016, 5 Car. & P. at 372. 
 56. (1803) 102 Eng. Rep. 724 (K.B.), 3 East 593. 
 57. Id. at 726, 3 East at 599 (Lord Ellenborough, C.J.). 
 58. See Anderson v. Arnold’s Ex’r, 79 Ky. 370 (1881) (holding that there was a common 
law trespass action for battery when the defendant’s testator shot at a third person but wounded 
the plaintiff); cf. Wright v. Clark, 50 Vt. 130 (1877) (liability for shooting dog when aiming 
at fox); Ball v. Axten, (1866) 176 Eng. Rep. 890 (Q.B.), 4 F. & F. 1019 (“assault” when 
defendant struck at dog with whip handle and hit plaintiff’s wife). 
 59. See supra text accompanying notes 12–20. 
 60. Prosser, supra note 3, at 653–54. 
 61. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 33. 
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intended to inflict upon even a third party an injury the same as, or 
closely similar to, that which the plaintiff had suffered.62 
If the common law did allow a defendant to avoid trespass liability by showing he 
was innocent of fault—something suggested in Weaver v. Ward63 but never clearly 
established—it would indeed “be natural to regard it as impossible for him to do this” 
if his conduct was intended to inflict upon a third party an injury similar to that which 
the plaintiff had suffered. But the defendant would be liable because the defendant 
did not plead and prove the absence of any fault, including negligence.64 The intent 
to inflict some injury upon a third party would not itself be the basis of liability. At 
most, it would serve as one variety of fault that would prevent the defendant from 
prevailing on the ground of freedom from all fault. No explicit or implied concept of 
transferred intent was in operation. 
In short, while a defendant could be liable for a common law trespass action when 
the defendant acted with an intent to cause a trespass to something or someone other 
than the plaintiff, the defendant’s liability would not be because of that intent. Intent 
to cause a trespass to either a plaintiff or anyone else was not an element of liability. 
The concept of transferred intent was known in criminal law, and criminal law 
concepts might be applied in a trespass or other civil cause of action, but it was not 
necessary for civil liability. The wide form of transferred intent envisaged by Prosser, 
including an intent to cause any legal wrong to person or property within the common 
law trespass action, is not to be found in premodern common law. 
III. AMERICAN CASES OUTSIDE THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
In the Transferred Intent article and subsequent edition of The Law of Torts, 
Prosser discussed or cited numerous American cases in support of his assertion that 
transferred intent operates within the five torts descended from the common law 
trespass action; intent to commit any one of the five satisfies the intent requirement 
for liability.65 In a few of the cases,66 acceptance of some form of transferred intent 
for battery or assault can be attributed to the First Restatement of Torts, discussed 
below.67 Those cases aside, the American cases cited by Prosser may support liability 
for battery in the typical “defendant intended to hit A but struck B” case and for 
assault when the defendant committed or attempted a battery to the plaintiff, but 
otherwise they do not support liability in the modern intentional torts (battery, 
assault, false imprisonment, trespass to chattels, and trespass to land) on the basis of 
transferred intent or what I have described as “interchangeable intent.”68 The primary 
reasons why the cases cited by Prosser do not support his claims about transferred 
                                                                                                                 
 
 62. This is a quotation from the reporter’s treatise for a tentative draft of the first 
Restatement of Torts. TORTS TREATISE NO. 1(a) SUPPORTING RESTATEMENT NO. 1, at 36 
(1925); see infra note 153. 
 63. (1616) 80 Eng. Rep. 284 (C.P.), Hobart 134. 
 64. Id. at 284, Hobart at 134. 
 65. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 33–34, 67–68; Prosser, supra note 3, at 655–61. 
 66. See infra note 122 and accompanying text. 
 67. See infra Part IV.  
 68. See supra text accompanying notes 26–28. 
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intent are that the defendant in the case did intend the result that created liability, so 
there was liability without transferred intent, or the defendant was held liable, or 
subject to liability, without the intent to cause a result (as distinct from the intent to 
do the act that caused the result) that is required by all of the modern intentional torts. 
A. Trespass to Land Cases  
The cases in which the defendant intended the result that created liability are cases 
of trespass to land. The defendant intentionally entered the plaintiff’s land—a 
trespass in itself. Defendants were held liable for damage or loss resulting from the 
trespass, although it was not intended. In some cases of this type, the defendant 
started a fire that damaged the plaintiff’s property.69 In others, the defendant removed 
a fence, allowing livestock to enter or stray,70 or caused damage by removing soil.71 
Analogous to the fence-removal cases, defendants were held liable when trespass to 
the plaintiff’s land resulted in loss of valuables that had been on the property.72 There 
was also liability for causing the death of the plaintiff’s dog during a trespass.73 
Liability for trespass extended to personal injuries74 and emotional distress75 suffered 
by occupants of the land as a result of the trespass. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 69. See, e.g., S. Cntys. Ice Co. v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 39 F. Supp. 157 (S.D. Cal. 
1941); Newsom v. Meyer, 128 A. 699 (Conn. 1925); Wyant v. Crouse, 86 N.W. 527 (Mich. 
1901); Lee v. Stewart, 10 S.E.2d 804 (N.C. 1940); Wetzel v. Satterwhite, 125 S.W. 93 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1910). 
 70. See, e.g., Garrett v. Sewell, 18 So. 737 (Ala. 1895); Kissecker v. Monn, 36 Pa. 313 
(1860); Damron v. Roach, 23 Tenn. (4 Hum.) 134 (1843). 
 71. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Boyle, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 78 (1835); Curtis v. Fruin-Colnon 
Contracting Co., 253 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. 1952); Whitehead v. Zeiller, 265 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1954). 
 72. Renaire Corp. v. Vaughn, 142 A.2d 148 (D.C. 1958) (tools in plaintiff’s house 
disappeared after defendant broke window in order to enter house); Eten v. Luyster, 60 N.Y. 
252 (1875) (money in feed box disappeared when defendants tore down plaintiff’s stable). 
 73. Accidentally in Van Alstyne v. Rochester Tel. Corp., 296 N.Y.S. 726 (Rochester City 
Ct. 1937) (dogs ate pieces of lead dropped by telephone company workers). Intentionally in 
City of Garland v. White, 368 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963) (policeman shot dog). 
 74. Rogers v. Bd. of Rd. Comm’rs for Kent Cnty., 30 N.W.2d 358 (Mich. 1948) 
(landowner killed when mowing machine hit fence anchor left on land); Bouillon v. Laclede 
Gaslight Co., 129 S.W. 401 (Mo. Ct. App. 1910) (trespassing meter reader allegedly caused 
plaintiff to suffer miscarriage); Brackett v. Bellows Falls Hydro-Electric Corp., 175 A. 822 
(N.H. 1934) (farmer injured when mowing machine hit burrow hole made by muskrats present 
on land because defendant flooded it); Kopka v. Bell Tel. Co. of Pa., 91 A.2d 232 (Pa. 1952) 
(plaintiff’s leg slipped into hole dug for telephone line); Turner v. Thorne (1959), 21 D.L.R. 
2d 29 (Can. Ont. High Ct.) (plaintiff fell over cartons left in his garage); see also infra 
notes 80–81. 
 75. Walker v. Ingram, 37 So. 2d 685 (Ala. 1948); Kornoff v. Kingsburg Cotton Oil Co., 
288 P.2d 507 (Cal. 1955); Sager v. Sisters of Mercy of Colo., 256 P. 8 (Colo. 1927); Barrow 
v. Ga. Lightweight Aggregate Co., 120 S.E.2d 636 (Ga. Ct. App. 1961); Ham v. Me.-N.H. 
Interstate Bridge Auth., 30 A.2d 1 (N.H. 1943). 
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It is apparent from the cases Prosser cited, and even from statements in the 
Transferred Intent article76 and Prosser’s treatise,77 that liability for unintended 
damage was not based on any concept of transferred intent or interchangeable intent. 
The defendants were liable because they had trespassed on the plaintiff’s land and 
the injury to the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s property was a consequence of the 
trespass.78 To the extent intent to cause any result was a necessary element of 
liability,79 it was an intent to cause what actually occurred and created a cause of 
action against the defendant—the entry into the plaintiff’s land. 
In some of the trespass to land cases involving personal injury, the injured person 
was not the possessor of the land. The plaintiff was the possessor’s spouse or child. 
There is no element of transferred intent in these cases. In allowing an action, the 
court either assumed without discussion that the plaintiff could sue on the basis of 
trespass as an occupant of the land80 or so held explicitly.81 As Prosser’s Transferred 
Intent article acknowledged, the rationale of these cases is that members of the 
possessor’s family “are regarded as sharing his possession so that the intrusion is a 
trespass toward them.”82 If transferred intent were the rationale, someone injured by 
a trespass but not an occupant or family member living on the land could maintain 
an action for trespass or battery—a proposition not supported by any authority 
referenced by Prosser.83 In one of the trespass to land cases involving personal injury 
to an occupant of the land, the court allowed recovery of damages for the injury in a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 76. Prosser, supra note 3, at 658–61. 
 77. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 67–68. 
 78. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 163 cmt. f (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 162 (1965); 1 FOWLER V. HARPER & FLEMING JAMES, JR., THE LAW OF TORTS 29 (1956). 
 79. Some cases reflect the older common law of trespass that did not require such an 
intent. E.g., Chi. & Nw. Ry. Co. v. Hunerberg, 16 Ill. App. 387 (1885) (train driven into 
plaintiff’s house, causing fright and shock resulting in miscarriage); Guille v. Swan, 19 Johns. 
381 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822) (balloonist descended into plaintiff’s garden; crowd following 
balloon trampled vegetables and flowers). 
 80. See Wardrop v. City of Manhattan Beach, 326 P.2d 15 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1958) 
(child); St. Petersburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cuccinello, 44 So. 2d 670 (Fla. 1950) (child); 
Preiser v. Wielandt, 62 N.Y.S. 890 (N.Y. App. Div. 1900) (spouse). 
 81. See Engle v. Simmons, 41 So. 1023 (Ala. 1906) (spouse); Watson v. Dilts, 89 N.W. 
1068 (Iowa 1902) (spouse); Lesch v. Great N. Ry. Co., 106 N.W. 955 (Minn. 1906) (spouse); 
Keesecker v. G.M. McKelvey Co., 27 N.E.2d 787 (Ohio App. 1940), subsequent proceedings, 
42 N.E.2d 223 (Ohio App. 1941), rev’d, 47 N.E.2d 211 (Ohio 1943) (child, applying 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 380 (1934)). 
 82. Prosser, supra note 3, at 659. 
 83. Prosser claimed this had occurred in Schmitt v. Kurrus, 85 N.E. 261 (Ill. 1908). 
Prosser, supra note 3, at 658. In Schmitt, during an altercation between the plaintiff and the 
defendant, the plaintiff went into a telephone booth within a store to call the police. The 
defendant struck the glass door of the booth with his fist. The glass broke and a piece went 
into the plaintiff’s eye. The plaintiff brought an action for assault and battery. The defendant 
denied assaulting the plaintiff but was held liable after a trial. Presumably the defendant 
committed a trespass for which the proprietor of the store could sue, but there is no suggestion 
in the court’s opinion that this was relevant to the defendant’s liability to the plaintiff. “The 
striking and breaking of the glass and driving it into the plaintiff’s eye was an assault and 
battery . . . .” Schmitt, 85 N.E. at 262. 
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trespass action but explicitly rejected liability for assault and battery because the 
defendant had no intent to do harm.84 
B. Other Cases Involving Damage to Property or Intent to Interfere with Property 
Similarly, none of the cases cited by Prosser actually supports the proposition that 
an intent to commit an assault or battery would allow an action for trespass to 
chattels,85 or that an intent to commit a trespass to land or physical interference with 
a chattel would allow an action for trespass to other land or a different chattel.86 To 
support his assertion that “one who intends a trespass to a chattel . . . is liable for 
battery when he hits a man,”87 Prosser cited cases of personal injury caused when the 
defendant fired a gun at a vehicle88 or a dog89 or attempted to strike a horse.90 In some 
of the cases, it is clear that the only basis of liability was negligence.91 In the case 
involving firing a gun at a vehicle,92 the only basis of liability suggested in the 
opinion is that firing the gun was an assault to the occupants of the vehicle.93 The 
                                                                                                                 
 
 84. Brabazon v. Joannes Bros. Co., 286 N.W. 21, 26 (Wis. 1939); see also White v. 
Sander, 47 N.E. 90 (Mass. 1897) (plaintiff had no action for fright caused by defendant’s 
throwing stone into house belonging to plaintiff’s father in absence of any intent to strike or 
frighten plaintiff).  
 85. In Vandenburgh v. Truax, 4 Denio 464 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1847), the defendant, with a 
pickaxe in his hands, pursued a boy. To protect himself, the boy went behind a counter in the 
plaintiff’s store. He accidentally knocked out the faucet of a wine cask, causing the wine to 
spill out. The basis of liability emphasized in the opinion is liability for the consequences of 
an act dangerous to the persons or property of others—in modern terms, negligence. The court 
suggested that the proper form of action was an action on the case rather than trespass. Id. at 
468. If a trespass action were allowable, it would at the time be the old common law action 
that required no intent to cause any injury or wrongful consequence. See supra Part II. 
 86. In People v. Washington, which arose from a juvenile offender adjudication that the 
court reversed, there is merely a statement in dictum that “[t]he appropriate remedy in such a 
situation is an ordinary civil action for damages.” 222 N.E.2d 378, 380 (N.Y. 1966). The 
“situation” was that the defendant’s companion threw a garbage can at a person but it struck a 
car. It is very likely that the “ordinary civil action” the court had in mind was a negligence 
action. John C. Kupferle Foundry Co. v. St. Louis Merchants’ Bridge Terminal Railway Co., 
205 S.W. 57 (Mo. 1918), is explicitly a negligence case. (The defendant’s employee pushed a 
railway car off a track, striking a tank containing naphtha for use in the plaintiff’s factory. This 
caused the naphtha to catch fire. The fire spread to the factory.) In City of Garland v. White, 
368 S.W.2d 12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963), both the trespass to land and the shooting of the 
plaintiff’s dog were intentional. 
 87. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 33; Prosser, supra note 3, at 655–56. 
 88. State ex rel. Harbin v. Dunn, 282 S.W.2d 203 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1943). 
 89. Corn v. Sheppard, 229 N.W. 869 (Minn. 1930); Belk v. Boyce, 138 S.E.2d 789 (N.C. 
1964); Isham v. Dow’s Estate, 41 A. 585 (Vt. 1898). 
 90. Osborne v. Van Dyke, 85 N.W. 784 (Iowa 1901). 
 91. Including “negligence per se” because of violation of statute. See id.; Belk, 138 S.E.2d 
789 (defendant found not negligent). In Osborne, it would not have been trespass to hit the 
horse because it was the defendant’s horse. 
 92. Harbin, 282 S.W.2d 203. 
 93. Id. at 207, 213.  
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principal defendant, a constable, was trying to stop the car and arrest the car’s 
occupants. The car overturned when a shot hit one of the rear tires.94 
Isham v. Dow’s Estate95 and Corn v. Sheppard96 may seem more plausible as 
cases supporting Prosser’s analysis, but only because the basis of liability in these 
cases is not clearly delineated. In the Isham case, Dow had (it seems) intentionally 
shot and wounded Mr. Isham’s dog. The dog ran into the Isham residence and 
knocked down Mrs. Isham, causing injuries. The primary basis of liability recognized 
in the court’s opinion is negligence, but the opinion also suggests liability to Mrs. 
Isham because the defendant “unlawfully, wantonly, and maliciously” shot at and 
wounded the dog97 and because the injury was the result of the defendant’s voluntary 
act,98 for which there was liability under the common law of trespass.99 In Corn v. 
Sheppard, the defendant shot at a dog that had been licking garbage cans at his house 
and wounded a boy the defendant had not seen. It was unlawful to shoot the dog 
because the dog posed no danger to people or other animals. The trial court charged 
the jury that the defendant’s act was unlawful and he was liable for the injury caused 
to the boy. The Supreme Court of Minnesota, affirming a judgment for the plaintiff, 
stated that the defendant was liable for the injury as a matter of law.100 This may have 
been because the defendant acted unlawfully, but the opinion can be read as applying 
a rule that there is liability for injury caused by the intentional discharge of a firearm 
unless the defendant was without fault (the defendant in the case being at fault 
because he acted unlawfully).101 There is nothing in Corn v. Sheppard suggesting 
that the plaintiff had a battery action because of the defendant’s intent to shoot the 
dog.102 
C. Transferred Intent in Assault, Battery, and False Imprisonment 
It should be clear from the above discussion that when Prosser wrote his 
Transferred Intent article and included its contents in his treatise, the law had not 
recognized any form of transferred intent involving trespass to land or trespass to 
                                                                                                                 
 
 94. Id. at 206.  
 95. 41 A. 585. 
 96. 229 N.W. 869. 
 97. Isham, 41 A. at 585. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Dow’s act caused the dog to be set in motion. This is comparable to Shepherd’s giving 
motion to the lighted squib in Scott v. Shepherd, see supra text accompanying notes 46–53, 
and Bray’s causing the plaintiff’s horses to break into a run in Leame v. Bray, see supra text 
accompanying notes 56–57. 
 100. Corn, 229 N.W. at 871. 
 101. In a later Minnesota case, Corn v. Sheppard was interpreted, strangely, as an 
application of the principle of res ipsa loquitur. Sutor v. Rogotzke, 194 N.W.2d 283, 285 
(Minn. 1972). 
 102. Compare Renner v. Canfield, 30 N.W. 435, 435 (Minn. 1886), in which a pregnant 
woman, with “nerves very sensitive,” was “so startled and frightened as to seriously affect her 
health” when she saw the defendant kill her father-in-law’s dog with a gun. The court decided 
that the defendant would not be held liable on the basis that killing the dog was unlawful 
because his act was not the proximate cause of the woman’s injuries. The injuries were not 
“consequences that may ensue in the ordinary and natural course of events.” Id. at 436. 
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chattels, either as the result or the intended consequence.103 Intent to commit a 
trespass to land or chattels did not supply the intent element for a different intentional 
tort, and intent to commit a tort to the person did not supply the intent element for a 
trespass action when the defendant caused damage to property. However, much of 
Prosser’s article is concerned with transferred intent within and between the three 
intentional torts to the person: battery, assault, and false imprisonment. His claim 
that transferred intent operated across the torts to the person could potentially be 
correct even though his claim that it operated across all the torts descended from the 
common law trespass action was incorrect. 
Again it is necessary to examine the cases Prosser cited and ascertain whether 
they support the existence of transferred intent in these torts. Prosser admitted that 
there were no cases of transferred intent involving false imprisonment. He assumed 
that such cases “would go along with the others” if they arose.104 But numerous cases 
were cited to support the existence of transferred intent in battery and assault.105 
Some are so clearly irrelevant to the issue of transferred intent as to require no 
further explanation.106 Others merely illustrate instances in which the plaintiff was 
injured by a bullet or other object aimed at someone else.107 In some of the cases with 
this fact pattern, the defendant was liable under the old common law of trespass 
because the plaintiff’s injury was the immediate or direct result of the defendant’s 
firing the gun or throwing what hit the plaintiff. No intent to commit any battery or 
assault was required.108 
                                                                                                                 
 
 103. See generally Reynolds, supra note 4, at 537–42. 
 104. Prosser, supra note 3, at 656. Prosser cited R. v. Huggins, (1730) 92 Eng. Rep. 518 
(K.B.), 2 Ld. Raym. 1574, 93 Eng. Rep. 915, 2 Stra. 883, finding a jailer guilty of murder for 
confining a prisoner in an unhealthy room, without sanitary facilities, and causing his death 
from illness. There is nothing in the case suggesting that there would be a battery action against 
the jailer for causing the illness rather than an action for false imprisonment (or battery when 
the prisoner was taken into the room) in which the illness would be included in consequential 
damages. 
 105. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 33; Prosser, supra note 3, at 655. 
 106. See, e.g., United States v. Jasper, 222 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1955) (military policeman 
not negligent in firing gun in order to subdue hostile crowd; innocent bystander wounded); 
Randall v. Ridgley, 185 So. 632 (La. App. 1939) (defendant shot plaintiff; liable whether 
plaintiff wounded deliberately or by carelessness); Purdy v. Woznesensky, [1937] 2 W.W.R. 
116 (Can. Sask. C.A.) (plaintiff had action for shock caused by witnessing attack on husband). 
 107. See, e.g., Tuttle v. Forsberg, 73 N.E.2d 861 (Ill. App. 1947) (car rental company not 
liable when policeman fired revolver at person suspected of not returning car and shot 
bystander); McKeon v. Manze, 157 N.Y.S. 623 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (saloon proprietor liable when 
saloon employee threw glass at customer but hit different customer); Shaw v. Lord, 137 P. 885 
(Okla. 1914) (bystander hit during exchange of gunshots between deputy marshal and fugitive; 
judgment against marshal reversed because of errors in jury instructions concerning defenses). 
Cf. Reynolds v. Pierson, 64 N.E. 484, 485 (Ind. App. 1902) (defendant caused plaintiff to fall 
when greeting person whose arm plaintiff was holding; liability because “there was such a 
reckless disregard of consequences on the part of the appellant as to imply an intention to 
assault plaintiff”). 
 108. E.g., Peterson v. Haffner, 59 Ind. 130 (1877) (defendant playfully threw piece of 
mortar at boy; hit boy’s brother); Anderson v. Arnold’s Executor, 79 Ky. 370 (1881) 
(defendant’s testator fired pistol at third person; bullet struck plaintiff); Murphy v. Wilson, 44 
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Some of the cases cited by Prosser more plausibly support some operation of 
transferred intent in battery or assault. The earliest of these, dating from the end of 
the nineteenth century, is Talmage v. Smith.109 The defendant ordered some boys to 
get down from the roof of his shed and threw a stick in the direction of two of the 
boys. The stick hit a third boy, whom the defendant had not seen. There was 
conflicting testimony on whether the defendant intended to hit the boys he had seen 
with the stick. The court approved the trial judge’s instruction that the defendant 
would be liable to the injured boy if the defendant threw the stick with the intent of 
hitting one of the boys he saw and it was unreasonable force in the circumstances. 
The opinion said that “the fact that the injury resulted to another than was intended 
does not relieve the defendant from responsibility.”110 However, the instruction was 
not based on transferred intent. The instruction and the exclusion of liability if the 
defendant used reasonable force, or only intended to frighten the boys he saw rather 
than hit one with the stick, must have been based on the defendant’s privilege as a 
landowner to use reasonable force to end the boys’ trespass on his property and 
liability if unreasonable force was used.111 If the privilege had not operated in the 
case, the defendant could have been held liable for trespass to the person without any 
intent to hit anyone with the stick. 
Transferred intent in battery was adopted in substance in a paragraph of a 1932 
Missouri case, Carnes v. Thompson.112 
[P]laintiff’s evidence was sufficient to justify a finding that defendant 
struck at plaintiff’s husband, in anger, with the pliers, and that, when he 
dodged the blow, plaintiff received it. If one person intentionally strikes 
at, throws at, or shoots at another, and unintentionally strikes a third 
person, he is not excused, on the ground that it was a mere accident, but 
it is an assault and battery of the third person. Defendant’s intention, in 
such a case, is to strike an unlawful blow, to injure some person by his 
act, and it is not essential that the injury be to the one intended.113  
Carnes v. Thompson was followed in Morrow v. Flores114 and Davis v. McKey,115 
in which the plaintiff had been struck by a bullet aimed at someone else.116 
A larger number of the cases cited by Prosser contain decisions that a defendant 
who struck the plaintiff while intending to strike someone else was liable because 
                                                                                                                 
 
Mo. 313 (1869) (bystander shot during gun fight between two groups). 
 109. 59 N.W. 656 (Mich. 1894). 
 110. Id. at 657. 
 111. See THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 193–95 (2d ed. 1888); 1 
FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 198–203 (4th ed. 1874); 1 EDGAR 
B. KINKEAD, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF TORTS 461–63 (1903). 
 112. 48 S.W.2d 903 (Mo. 1932). 
 113. Id. at 904. 
 114. 225 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). 
 115. 167 So. 2d 416 (La. App. 1964), writ refused, 168 So. 2d 822, 823 (La. 1964). 
 116. The opinions in Carnes v. Thompson and Morrow v. Flores cited primarily cases that 
arose from similar facts but did not ground liability in transferred intent. In Davis v. McKey, 
the only citation is to Carnes v. Thompson. 
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the defendant’s act was “wanton,”117 committed with malice,118 “wrongful,”119 or 
“unlawful.”120 Arguably the defendant’s having the intent to commit a battery to a 
third person is why the defendant’s act was characterized as malicious, wrongful, or 
unlawful, with the consequence that the defendant was liable in an action for battery. 
But this is not the same as applying an intent requirement to the battery action that 
the intent toward the third person fulfills.121 A few of these cases do, at some point 
in the opinion, endorse the concept of transferred intent, citing secondary authority 
that drew this from the First Restatement of Torts.122 
Although not overlooked entirely, the most likely operation of what I would call 
“interchangeable intent”123 is given little emphasis in the Transferred Intent article: 
the defendant’s intent to commit a battery fulfills an element of liability for assault.124 
This would explain why courts in so many cases have said that there was liability for 
assault and battery, without any indication that the defendant intended assault as 
such, and why defendants who intended to strike the plaintiff but missed would be 
liable for assault if the plaintiff was put in apprehension of being struck.125 The 
opposite situation—a defendant who intended only an assault but unintentionally 
struck and wounded the plaintiff—is represented in the article by only one case in 
point,126 a case which adopted the Restatement position that intent to put a person in 
apprehension of harmful (or offensive) bodily contact supports a battery action.127 
For the uncommon occurrence of assault by an act intended to cause an assault to a 
                                                                                                                 
 
 117. Bannister v. Mitchell, 104 S.E. 800 (Va. 1920). 
 118. Davis v. Collins, 48 S.E. 469 (S.C. 1904). 
 119. Keel v. Hainline, 331 P.2d 397 (Okla. 1958). 
 120. Singer v. Marx, 301 P.2d 440 (Cal. App. 1956); Lopez v. Surchia, 246 P.2d 111 (Cal. 
App. 1952); Smith v. Moran, 193 N.E.2d 466 (Ill. App. 1963).  
 121. See generally Nancy J. Moore, Intent and Consent in the Tort of Battery: Confusion 
and Controversy, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1585, 1606–12 (2012) (discussing liability for battery, 
without an intent to cause harmful or offensive bodily contact, prior to the Restatement of 
Torts). 
 122. Moran, 193 N.E.2d 466; Keel, 331 P.2d 397. 
 123. See supra text accompanying notes 26–28. 
 124. Prosser, supra note 3, at 655. 
 125. See Lewis v. Hoover, 3 Blackf. 407 (Ind. 1834); Townsdin v. Nutt, 19 Kan. 282 
(1877); Nielson v. Eiler, 227 N.W. 688 (Mich. 1929). Assault was often equated with an 
attempt to commit battery. See Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Hill, 150 So. 709 (Ala. App. 
1933), cert. denied, 150 So. 711 (Ala. 1933); Prince v. Ridge, 66 N.Y.S. 454 (Sup. Ct. 1900); 
Bishop v. Ranney, 7 A. 820 (Vt. 1887); Degenhardt v. Heller, 68 N.W. 411 (Wis. 1896); TORTS 
TREATISE NO. 1(a) SUPPORTING RESTATEMENT NO. 1, at 64–67 (1925); MELVILLE MADISON 
BIGELOW, THE LAW OF TORTS 323–25 (8th ed. 1907); 1 EDWIN A. JAGGARD, HAND-BOOK OF 
THE LAW OF TORTS 431–33 (1895). An intent to strike the plaintiff may have been the reason 
for liability in the oldest known case of assault as a tort. I. de S. et ux. v. W. de S., Y.B. 22 
Edw. 3, fol. 99, pl. 60 (K.B. 1348), translated in VICTOR E. SCHWARTZ, KATHRYN KELLY & 
DAVID F. PARTLETT, PROSSER, WADE AND SCHWARTZ’S TORTS CASES AND MATERIALS 39 
(13th ed. 2015). 
 126. Brown v. Martinez, 361 P.2d 152 (N.M. 1961). 
 127. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 16 (1934). See infra text accompanying notes 130–33. A 
second such case, Weisbart v. Flohr, 67 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Ct. App. 1968), is cited in Prosser’s 
treatise. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 33. 
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different person, Prosser cited a single case in which liability was based primarily on 
the willful and wanton nature of the defendant’s conduct.128 
D. Summary 
The cases discussed or cited by Prosser do show some normative results: First, 
there was usually liability for trespass to the person or battery when the defendant 
intended to strike a third person but unintentionally hit the plaintiff, absent a valid 
defense such as self-defense. Second, liability for trespass to the person or battery 
was typically liability for “assault and battery.” But the cases do not support the 
conclusion that transferred intent had been generally accepted as a basis of liability 
for intentional torts, even battery. 
How, then, has it come to be accepted in American tort law that there is a concept 
of transferred intent that operates in battery, assault, and (in a more limited way) false 
imprisonment, but not trespass to land or chattels? The answer is: the Restatement of 
Torts. 
IV. THE RESTATEMENT OF TORTS AND TRANSFERRED INTENT 
A. Battery and Assault 
Work on development of a Restatement of Torts began soon after the foundation 
of the American Law Institute (ALI) in 1923.129 From the first drafts to the final text, 
battery and assault were identified as intentional torts, requiring for liability an intent 
to cause either a touching of another’s person or apprehension of such a touching 
(soon refined to intent to cause a harmful or offensive touching or apprehension of 
such a touching).130 An intent to cause a battery would fulfill the intent requirement 
of an assault action if the defendant’s act caused apprehension of a harmful or 
offensive bodily contact, and an intent to cause an assault would fulfill the intent 
requirement of a battery action if the defendant’s act resulted in an unintended 
harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff’s person. The intent requirements of 
battery and assault were interchangeable in the sense that either an intent to cause a 
battery or an intent to cause an assault fulfilled the intent requirement of each tort. 
                                                                                                                 
 
 128. Jeppsen v. Jensen, 155 P. 429 (Utah 1916) (defendant, in the plaintiff’s presence, 
allegedly threatened to kill the plaintiff’s husband with a pistol). 
 129. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS xi (1934). The drafts and other preparatory documents for 
the Restatement cited in this article are published in the American Law Institute Library of 
HeinOnline (www.heinonline.org). Citations include the retrospective numbering of early 
drafts in the HeinOnline collection. 
 130. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: BATTERY §§ 1, 11, ASSAULT § 1 (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 
1923); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ I.10, II.5 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 1924); RESTATEMENT 
OF TORTS §§ 2, 8, 12, 22, 27, 43 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1925); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 13, 
16, 18, 20, 21, 32 (1934). The earliest draft included sections on liability for trespass to the 
person, which required only a “wrongful act.” RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: TRESPASS TO THE 
PERSON §§ 1–3 (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 1923). The sections were not included in later drafts 
or the final text. 
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Why the Restatement presented battery as an intentional tort but allowed liability 
when no battery was intended is explained in the final text only by the statement that 
The interest in freedom from either [harmful or offensive] contact or 
from the apprehension thereof is so far a part of the other’s interest in his 
bodily security that the intention to inflict an offensive contact or to 
create an apprehension of either a harmful or offensive contact is 
sufficient to make the actor liable for a harmful contact resulting 
therefrom, even though such harmful contact was not intended.131 
There is no corresponding explanation of why there could be assault liability when 
apprehension of bodily contact was not intended. A more substantial explanation was 
given in a treatise written by the Reporter of the Restatement, Francis H. Bohlen, to 
support the first Tentative Draft.132 
If one’s act violates either another’s right to freedom from bodily 
harm or from offensive touchings or his right derived therefrom to 
freedom from apprehension of such violations, it is not necessary that the 
act be done with the intention of bringing about a violation of the 
particular right which is actually violated. All of these rights are regarded 
as so closely connected, the one with the other, that an act done with the 
intention of violating any one of them but causing a violation of another 
creates the same liability as though the act were done with the specific 
intention of bringing about the particular violation which results from it. 
Since the right to freedom from apprehension of the immediate 
infliction of an intentional and harmful or offensive bodily touching was 
itself created by the fact that attempts to inflict either form of touching 
were punishable by an action of trespass, it is obvious that the intention 
to inflict either form of touching was necessarily sufficient to support an 
action of trespass for a mere assault though the attempt to inflict a battery 
failed. It is not so obvious that an act which is not intended to do bodily 
harm but merely to bring about an apprehension of a harmful or offensive 
touching and which is not done under such circumstances as to make it 
likely to cause bodily harm or an offensive touching should be regarded 
as sufficient to create liability for bodily harm or an offensive touching 
                                                                                                                 
 
 131. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 16 cmt. a (1934). 
 132. TORTS TREATISE NO. 1(a) SUPPORTING RESTATEMENT NO. 1 (1925).  During the ALI 
annual meeting in which the draft was discussed, Bohlen said that the subject of assault, 
battery, and false imprisonment was uninteresting and had considerable difficulty. Francis H. 
Bohlen, Discussion of the Tentative Draft, Torts, Restatement No. 1, 3 A.L.I. PROC. 282 
(1925). Nevertheless, he produced a lengthy treatise in a short period of time. The treatise is 
valuable for its explanation of the provisions of Tentative Draft No. 1 (1925), which are similar 
to the final text regarding transferred intent in battery, assault, and false imprisonment, and 
indication of what authority supported the provisions. Unfortunately no similar treatise was 
produced for other portions of the Restatement. See Patrick J. Kelley, The First Restatement 
of Torts: Reform by Descriptive Theory, 32 S. ILL. U. L.J. 93, 131–33 (2007). 
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unexpectedly resulting from it. None the less what authority there is upon 
the subject is to the effect that such an intent is sufficient therefor.133 
Elsewhere in the treatise, the defendant’s intent to commit a battery is emphasized 
as a basis of liability for assault.134 Attempts to commit batteries were a “breach of 
the King’s peace” that could lead to violent reprisals unless the target’s grievance 
was redressed by legal process. “Since batteries were redressed and punished by the 
action of trespass it was natural that attempts to commit them should also be 
redressible and punishable in that action.”135 
While Bohlen seems to have had no hesitation in asserting that intent to cause a 
battery would support an action for assault and vice versa, the question of whether 
there was liability when the defendant’s intent was to cause a battery or assault to a 
person other than the plaintiff was identified as a major issue in the earliest drafts of 
the Restatement.136 Bohlen believed that there were three alternatives. The first was 
that an intent to touch the plaintiff or put him in apprehension was necessary to 
liability. The second was that an intent to touch a third party or put him in 
apprehension would be a basis of liability. The third was that an intent to touch a 
third person or put him in apprehension would be a basis of liability if the defendant 
knew (or, possibly, had reason to expect) that the plaintiff was in close proximity to 
the third party.137 Bohlen found no relevant precedents in assault cases and few in 
battery cases. He recognized that intent was not the stated basis for liability in these 
cases. In every case in which an action of “trespass of battery” had been sustained 
against one whose act was directed against a third party, the defendant’s act was 
wrongful toward the plaintiff because the reasonable person would have recognized 
a risk of injury to the plaintiff. In criminal law it was necessary to the establishment 
of guilt that the defendant’s conduct be brought within the rigid definitions of 
particular crimes. But there was no such necessity in the law of torts.138 There were 
few cases in which the plaintiff was actually harmed in which redress could not be 
given on the basis of “a wrong of probability” (negligence), and in those cases there 
was no “obvious certainty of the justice of his claim.”139 Extending the definition of 
battery and assault to include acts directed against third parties would make it 
“cumbersome and elaborate.”140 It was therefore advisable to “restrict the definition 
                                                                                                                 
 
 133. TORTS TREATISE NO. 1(a) SUPPORTING RESTATEMENT NO. 1, at 32–33 (1925). The 
same explanation, in condensed form, is given for the provisions on liability for offensive 
touching and assault. Id. at 57, 90. The only “authority” cited is Johnson v. Mack, 104 N.W. 
395 (Mich. 1905), in which the defendant intentionally fired a gun in the plaintiff’s direction 
to stop his running away, but the basis of liability was “wanton and willful conduct.” Id. at 
396. 
 134. See TORTS TREATISE NO. 1(a) SUPPORTING RESTATEMENT NO. 1, at 65–67 (1925); see 
also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, at 6–9 (1923) (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 1923). 
 135. TORTS TREATISE NO. 1(a) SUPPORTING RESTATEMENT NO. 1, at 65–66 (1925). 
 136. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS: BATTERY §§ 1, 11, ASSAULT § 1 (Preliminary Draft No. 
2, 1923); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS at 3, 10 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 1923). 
 137. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS at 10 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 1923). Bohlen thought 
the same rule should apply to both battery and assault. 
 138. Id. at 10–13. 
 139. Id. at 16–17. 
 140. Id. at 16. 
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of battery to harmful or offensive touchings directly caused by an act done for the 
purpose of causing such a touching to the plaintiff or at the least of putting him in 
apprehension thereof.”141 
Bohlen would preclude liability for non-harmful offensive touchings and for 
assault when the defendant’s intent was directed toward a third person. The 
probability that the defendant’s act could cause a non-harmful touching of the body 
or apprehension was not a basis of liability. Assault should not be regarded as a 
punitive action in which a defendant would be punished if his conduct was an act of 
aggression against a third person.142 The law of torts should not adopt the “highly 
elaborate and artificial concept of constructive or transferred intent.”143 
Despite Bohlen’s emphatic arguments against third-party transferred intent and 
belief that case law had not incorporated it into civil liability for assault and battery, 
a preliminary draft of the Restatement produced several months later provided for 
liability when the defendant acted with the intention of inflicting a harmful or 
offensive contact to the plaintiff or a third party, or of putting the plaintiff or a third 
party in apprehension thereof.144 In the absence of a published explanation, one can 
only surmise that the Advisers for the Restatement had disagreed with Bohlen and 
concluded that an intent to inflict a battery or assault upon a third person was 
sufficient for liability, even when the plaintiff’s presence was unknown to the 
defendant. This continued to be the position of the Restatement in drafts submitted 
to the ALI’s membership145 and the final text.146 The provisions of the final text on 
harmful-contact battery,147 offensive-contact battery148 and assault149 have a uniform 
intent requirement: acting with an intent to cause a harmful or offensive contact with 
the person or an apprehension of a harmful or offensive bodily contact to either the 
plaintiff or a third person.150 
Bohlen included support for this position in his treatise: 
[T]he principle . . . works no hardship to a defendant who intended and 
expected to inflict harm upon a third party substantially similar to that 
which the plaintiff suffers, and the plaintiff, whose injury is the same as 
                                                                                                                 
 
 141. Id. at 13. Bohlen would reject Talmage v. Smith, 59 N.W. 656 (Mich. 1894); see supra 
text accompanying notes 109–11, because it allowed the defendant to be liable for trespass to 
the person without knowledge that the plaintiff was on the shed and there was a probability of 
harm to the plaintiff. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS at 14–15 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 1923). 
 142. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, at 15–16 (Preliminary Draft No. 3, 1923). 
 143. Id. at 16. 
 144. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ I(2).1, I(2).19, II.1, II.13 (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 1924). 
 145. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 2, 10, 12, 24, 27, 45 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1925); 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 13, 16, 18, 20, 21, 32 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1934). 
 146. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 13, 16, 18, 20, 21, 32 (1934). 
 147. Id. §§ 13, 16. 
 148. Id. §§ 18, 20. 
 149. Id. §§ 21, 32. 
 150. There are slight variations in the language of the relevant sections of the Restatement 
but the substance is the same. 
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though the act had been intended to inflict it, should be permitted to 
recover unless it would be unjust to the defendant to hold him liable.151 
Concerning the defendant whose intent was to cause an offensive touching to a 
third person, 
There is no direct authority which holds that an act done with the 
intention of affecting a third party . . . creates liability to another to whom 
it causes an offensive touching, but there is no case or dictum which 
denies its existence and there are cases recognizing and none denying 
liability where an act done with such an intention causes bodily harm to 
another. The interests in freedom from bodily harm and in freedom from 
offensive touchings were both given legal protection by the same action 
of trespass for battery, and it would seem, therefore, that the same 
liability should arise when the act causes an offensive touching as where 
it causes bodily harm.152 
A similar statement, including the absence of case authority, was made about 
liability for assault.153 
B. False Imprisonment 
Under the older common law, false imprisonment was a trespass to the person, as 
were battery and assault.154 The Restatement grouped false imprisonment with 
battery and assault as “intentional invasions of interests in personality.”155 As 
discussed above, in the provisions on battery and assault an intent to commit either 
tort was sufficient for liability. But this was not extended to include an intent to 
commit false imprisonment. For false imprisonment the only intent that satisfied the 
Restatement’s requirements for liability was an intent to confine a person.156 A 
defendant would therefore not be liable to a false imprisonment action on the basis 
of having acted with an intent to cause a battery (harmful or offensive bodily contact) 
or an assault (apprehension of such a contact). 
Why the arguments for treating an intent to commit the other tort as sufficient for 
battery and assault were not also applied to false imprisonment is not explained in 
the Restatement drafts or Bohlen’s treatise. Perhaps the reason is that false 
imprisonment did not have the close association with battery and assault that battery 
                                                                                                                 
 
 151. TORTS TREATISE NO. 1(a) SUPPORTING RESTATEMENT NO. 1, at 36–37 (1925). 
 152. Id. at 61. 
 153. Id. at 91–92. The treatise also contained the statement quoted and discussed supra, in 
text accompanying notes 60–64, that originally a defendant who directly caused bodily harm 
was prima facie liable as a trespasser, and could not exculpate himself as innocent of fault, 
when he intended to inflict a similar injury upon a third party. Id. at 36. 
 154. Id. at 96–97; RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 35 cmt. a. (1934). 
 155. 1 RESTATEMENT OF TORTS ch. 2 (1934); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 1 (Tentative Draft 
No. 1, 1925) (“Conduct Intentionally Violating the Rights of Personality”). 
 156. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § III.10 (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 1924); RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS § 61 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1925); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 35 (Preliminary Draft 
No. 65, 1933); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 35 (1934). 
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and assault had with each other. Also, it may have been thought that an unintended 
confinement caused by an act intended to cause a battery or assault, or the opposite, 
was so unlikely to occur that there was no need to provide for it, and an unintended 
confinement that caused bodily harm could be the basis of negligence liability.157 
While the provisions on false imprisonment excluded liability based on an intent 
to cause a different type of interference with the person, the Restatement adopted 
liability based on an intent to cause the same type of interference to a different 
person. An intent to cause another person to be confined would satisfy the intent 
requirement of the plaintiff’s false imprisonment action.158 There would thus be 
third-party transferred intent in false imprisonment, as well as in battery and 
assault.159 The explanation for this in Bohlen’s treatise is that 
In view of the common origin of these various rights of personality it is 
believed that there is no difference, in this respect, whether the interest 
invaded be the interest in freedom from bodily harm, or the interest in 
freedom from offensive bodily touchings, or the interest in freedom from 
apprehension of a harmful or offensive touching, or the interest in 
freedom from conscious confinement.160 
There was no case that decided that a person who acted with the intention of 
confining a third party was liable for false imprisonment, but there was no case that 
denied the existence of such liability.161 
C. Trespass to Chattels and Trespass to Land 
The first drafts of the Restatement’s sections on trespass to chattels and trespass 
to land were written after the issues of transferred intent in battery, assault, and false 
imprisonment had been settled.162 The provisions on trespass to chattels in the 
Restatement drafts and final text contain no element of transferred intent.163 In the 
earliest draft, trespass to chattels was not an intentional tort. It extended to causing 
contact with the chattel or taking possession of it intentionally, negligently, or in the 
                                                                                                                 
 
 157. See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 61 cmt. (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1925); RESTATEMENT 
OF TORTS § 35 cmt. h. (1934). 
 158. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § III.10 (Preliminary Draft No. 6, 1924); RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS §§ 43, 49 (Preliminary Draft No. 9, 1924); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 49, 63 (Tentative 
Draft No. 1, 1925); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 35, 43 (1934). 
 159. This was not in the earliest drafts prepared by Bohlen, which did not include 
third-party transferred intent in the sections on battery and assault. See RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS: FALSE IMPRISONMENT § 8 (Preliminary Draft No. 2, 1923); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
§ III.4 (Preliminary Draft No. 4, 1924). 
 160. TORTS TREATISE NO. 1(a) SUPPORTING RESTATEMENT NO. 1, at 134 (1925). 
 161. Id. 
 162. The first draft concerned with trespass to chattels is apparently Preliminary Draft No. 
55 (1932). The first draft on trespass to land is apparently Preliminary Draft No. 37 (1930), 
but the provision on liability of a trespasser to occupants of the land, discussed infra text 
accompanying notes 177–93, originated as early as Preliminary Draft No. 25 (1928).  
 163. The main provisions on trespass to chattels in the final text are in RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS §§ 216–22 (1934). 
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course of an extrahazardous activity.164 However, it was soon reformulated as an 
intentional tort, leaving unintentional interferences with chattels to the Restatement’s 
sections on negligence, reckless conduct, and strict liability.165 Liability for trespass 
to chattels required using or taking the chattel or otherwise intentionally 
“intermeddling” with it. There was no provision for or discussion of liability based 
on an intent to interfere with other property or with an “interest in personality.” Only 
the person in possession of the chattel or entitled to its immediate position could 
maintain an action.166 If the trespass caused harm to other property of the plaintiff, 
or bodily harm to the plaintiff or “some person . . . in which the [plaintiff] has a 
legally protected interest,” the plaintiff could obtain damages for this in the trespass 
to chattels action.167 
The main provisions on trespass to land, in the drafts168 and the Restatement’s 
final text,169 likewise contain no element of transferred intent. Insofar as liability for 
trespass to land was based on the actor’s intent,170 the only intent that was a basis of 
liability was an intent to cause an entry into the plaintiff’s land or permit something 
to remain there.171 A trespasser was liable only to the person considered to have 
possession of the land at the time of the trespass.172 If the trespass caused harm to 
other property of the possessor, or personal harm to the possessor or a person in 
whom the possessor had a “legally protected interest,” the trespasser was liable for 
this, but only as consequential damages to the possessor, to be recovered in the 
possessor’s action for trespass to land.173 
                                                                                                                 
 
 164. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS Part VI §§ 1, 7 (Preliminary Draft No. 55, 1932). 
 165. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 1101–1103, 1118 (Preliminary Draft No. 59, 1933); 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 1104–1109 (Preliminary Draft No. 60, 1933).  
 166. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 158–163 (Preliminary Draft No. 63, 1933); RESTATEMENT 
OF TORTS §§ 158–163 (Preliminary Draft No. 67, 1933); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 158–163 
(Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1934); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 217–222 (1934). A person 
entitled to future possession could have an action derived from the common law action on the 
case. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 220 (1934). 
 167. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 218–219 (1934). The “person . . . in which the [plaintiff] 
has a legally protected interest” is probably a person whose injuries could be the basis of a 
claim for loss of services or consortium—usually a spouse or child of the plaintiff. Id. Cf. 
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 165 cmt. c. (1934) (injury caused by trespass to land). See infra 
note 173. 
 168. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 1001–1011 (Tentative Draft No. 7, 1931); RESTATEMENT 
OF TORTS §§ 1000–1011, 1001A–1001B (Preliminary Draft No. 66, 1933); RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS §§ 1000–1011A (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 1934). 
 169. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 157–166 (1934). 
 170. Reflecting older common law, the Restatement included unintentional intrusions 
under the label trespass, but liability for unintentional intrusions required actual damage and 
was to be based on negligence, recklessness, or strict liability for an extrahazardous activity. 
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 165–166 and preceding scope note (1934). 
 171. Including personally entering the land or remaining there. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS 
§§ 158, 163 (1934). 
 172. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 157, 162 (1934). 
 173. Id. §§ 163 cmt. f, 165. A possessor’s interests included “the physical condition of the 
members of his family and the servants belonging to his household.” Id. § 165 cmt. c. Presumably 
this was because the common law gave the head of a household an action to recover damages for 
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In the earliest preliminary draft, the Reporter for the trespass to land chapters of 
the Restatement, Edward S. Thurston, raised the question of whether there was 
liability for an entry into land when the actor did not intend the entry but did intend 
another wrong to the possessor of the land or a third person. He gave the example of 
someone who intended to strike a person and accidentally fell onto the land of that 
person or the land of a third party. He also considered whether there would be 
liability if an act intended to cause an unauthorized entry into one person’s land 
resulted in an entry into the land of another. Thurston concluded that there would 
probably be liability if harm was caused by the entry into the land but no liability if 
there was no harm.174 He drafted an additional section that would incorporate this in 
the Restatement.175 Neither the section nor the discussion was included in later drafts. 
Transferred intent did not become a basis of liability when there was an unintended 
entry into the plaintiff’s land.176 
While transferred intent was never a basis of liability in the Restatement’s 
chapters on trespass to land, one of the many sections in the chapters on negligence 
liability contained a “special rule” subjecting trespassers to liability for bodily harm 
caused to members of the household of the possessor of the land: 
A trespasser on land is subject to liability for bodily harm caused to the 
possessor thereof or to members of his household by any act done, 
activity carried on or condition created by the trespasser while upon the 
land irrespective of whether the trespasser’s conduct is such as would 
subject him to liability were he not a trespasser.177 
“[M]embers of [his] household” included all persons living for “more than a merely 
temporary period” in the possessor’s residence, as family members, guests, or 
domestic servants.178 While the text of the section could be read as recognizing a 
                                                                                                                 
 
loss of services when a child or servant was injured and allowed a husband to recover for loss of 
services and consortium when his wife was injured. See 2 THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 10–13, 25–30, 56–57 (D. Avery Haggard ed., 4th ed. 1932); FOWLER 
VINCENT HARPER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TORTS 562–66, 574–76 (1933); WILLIAM L. 
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 938–43 (1941). 
 174. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, special note to § 2A (Preliminary Draft No. 37, 1930). 
 175. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 2B (Preliminary Draft No. 37, 1930). Its text specifically 
addressed the actor who intended an “invasion of an interest of personality” (battery, assault, 
or false imprisonment) or trespass to land possessed by someone other than the plaintiff. Id. 
 176. The final text of the Restatement specified that there was no liability for an 
unintentional and non-negligent entry except when the actor was engaged in an extrahazardous 
activity. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 166 (1934). 
 177. Id. § 380. Probably this was placed within the provisions on negligence liability to 
indicate the difference between the “special rule” of liability without negligence and the 
general rule stated in the next section (§ 381), under which a trespasser could be held liable 
for negligently causing harm to persons on the land, including people who were not part of the 
possessor’s household. Id. § 381. 
 178. Id. § 380 cmt. b. Section 380 contained a caveat stating: “The Institute expresses no 
opinion as to whether a trespasser on land is subject to the liability stated in this Section to the 
possessor’s servants who, though not members of the possessor’s household, are resident on 
the premises.” Id. § 380 caveat. 
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claim by the possessor of the land for loss to the possessor sustained on account of 
bodily harm to a member of his household, a comment for the section179 and caveat180 
indicate that the intended meaning is that the trespasser would be liable to the injured 
person. 
This section originated in drafts that preceded the drafts on liability for trespass 
to land generally. It proved to be one of the most controversial provisions bearing on 
liability for trespass. Under the earliest version, a trespasser was liable for bodily 
harm sustained by members of the possessor’s household and others lawfully on the 
premises with the possessor’s consent.181 As there was opposition to inclusion of 
persons who were not members of the household,182 the next drafts provided that a 
trespasser was liable for bodily harm to members of the possessor’s household and 
stated in a caveat that no position was taken on whether a trespasser was subject to 
the same liability for harm to other persons lawfully on the land as licensees or 
business invitees of the possessor.183 But the Council of the ALI decided to revise 
the provision so that it would apply to injuries to the servants of the possessor of the 
land regardless of whether the servant was a member of the possessor’s household 
or lived on the land.184 
This provoked a critical commentary by Professor Bohlen as Reporter for the 
Restatement.185 Bohlen’s position was that the liability for bodily harm resulting 
from a trespass extended only to the possessor of the land, or at least no further than 
members of the possessor’s family residing on the land.186 It also generated 
considerable debate at the next annual meeting of the ALI.187 A motion to limit 
liability to harm to the possessor was defeated,188 but a motion to limit liability to 
harm to the possessor and members of the household passed by a narrow margin.189 
After further consideration the Council agreed to the final form of the provision, 
limiting the trespasser’s liability to harm sustained by the possessor or a member of 
                                                                                                                 
 
 179. Id. § 380 cmt. d. The comment gives the example of a person who trespasses by 
driving on C’s private road and runs over C’s child. It states that the driver is liable to the child 
as well as to C. Id. § 380 illus. 1. 
 180. Id. § 380 caveat. See supra note 178. 
 181. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 250 (Preliminary Draft No. 25, 1928); RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS § 251 (Preliminary Draft No. 27, 1928). 
 182. See GEORGE W. WHEELER, COMMENTS ON RESTATEMENT OF TORTS PRELIMINARY 
DRAFT NO. 27, at 11 (1929). 
 183. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 250 (Preliminary Draft No. 29, 1929); RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS § 250 (Preliminary Draft No. 30, 1929); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 250 (Preliminary 
Draft No. 31, 1929). A minority of the Advisers advocated an alternative version, under which 
the trespasser would incur liability to the possessor or members of the household only when 
the trespasser knew or should have known he was a trespasser. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 251, 
note to Council (Preliminary Draft No. 31, 1929). 
 184. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 251 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1930); Bohlen, supra note 132 
at 204. 
 185. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, explanatory notes, at 5–14 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1930). 
 186. Id. at 5, 13; Bohlen, supra note 132 at 200–03, 222–33; 11 A.L.I. PROC. 582–83 
(1934). 
 187. See Bohlen, supra note 132 at 199–223. 
 188. Id. at 223. 
 189. Id. at 221–22. 
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the possessor’s household (defined to include domestic servants and guests living in 
the possessor’s residence), but with a caveat concerning servants “who though not 
members of the possessor’s household are resident on the premises.”190 
It is debatable whether this section, for which there was no precedent,191 adopted 
a type of transferred intent liability for trespass to land. Arguably it did not, because 
an action was allowed (absent negligence or strict liability) only when the defendant 
intentionally intruded into the land where the plaintiff lived.192 On the other hand, 
even if it is correct to regard a spouse or other immediate family member as sharing 
possession of the land with the person who has title as owner or tenant,193 in no sense 
could the land be considered the property of a domestic servant or guest. So it would 
seem that the injured person is given an action because the defendant had an intent 
to interfere with a different type of interest belonging to a different person—the land 
possessor’s property interest. 
D. Second Restatement 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts was developed about thirty years after the First 
Restatement. Prosser was the Reporter for the project. There is no indication in the 
available documents on the Second Restatement194 that there was any proposal by 
Prosser or others to take a position on transferred intent different from that of the first 
Restatement or any opposition to the Second Restatement’s incorporation of what 
had been in the first Restatement. With respect to whether an intent to interfere with 
a different type of interest or with the interests of a third person would fulfill the 
intent requirement of an action for battery, assault, false imprisonment, trespass to 
chattels, or trespass to land, the provisions of the Second Restatement195 are almost 
identical to those of the First Restatement. In essence, the contribution of the Second 
Restatement to the law of transferred intent was its endorsement of what had been in 
the First Restatement. 
There were limited revisions to the language of the relevant sections and 
comments, including the refinement that for battery and assault an intent to cause 
apprehension of a harmful or offensive bodily contact must be to cause apprehension 
                                                                                                                 
 
 190. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 250 (Proposed Final Draft No. 2, 1934); RESTATEMENT OF 
TORTS § 380 (1934). 
 191. There were cases allowing claims in trespass by the spouse of the person with title to 
the property, but none allowing claims by people outside the possessor’s immediate family. 
See RESTATEMENT OF TORTS, explanatory notes, at 13 (Tentative Draft No. 5, 1930); Bohlen, 
supra note 132 at 200–01. 
 192. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 
VAND. L. REV. 1, 26 (1998) (inclusion of members of the possessor’s household is in 
accordance with contemporary explanations regarding property rights, leaving intact the 
fundamental requirement that only those whose property right is violated can sue for trespass). 
 193. See supra text accompanying notes 80–83. 
 194. Preliminary drafts, council drafts, and tentative drafts are in the American Law 
Institute Library of HeinOnline (www.heinonline.org), and transcripts of ALI annual meetings 
are published in American Law Institute Proceedings. 
 195. 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 2, 7, 9 (1965). The relevant section numbers 
are the same as in the First Restatement. See infra notes 201–04. 
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of an imminent contact,196 and some reorganization of the text on trespass to 
chattels.197 The “special rule” of trespass to land concerning harm to members of the 
household of the possessor of the land was moved from its anomalous location in the 
provisions on negligence198 to the main provisions on trespass to land, within the 
section that had provided that a trespasser was liable only to the person in possession 
of the land at the time of the trespass.199 The Second Restatement’s version of this 
section is that the trespasser is liable for physical harm to the possessor of the land, 
his things or the land, or members of his household or their things.200 
V. CASE LAW FOLLOWS THE RESTATEMENT 
As discussed in the previous section of this Article, the First and Second 
Restatements recognized liability based on transferred intent in the following 
circumstances: 
(1) liability for battery when acting with an intent to commit a battery 
to a different person; 
(2) liability for battery when acting with an intent to commit an 
assault;201 
(3) liability for assault when acting with an intent to commit an assault 
upon a different person; 
(4) liability for assault when acting with an intent to commit a 
battery;202 
(5) liability for false imprisonment when acting with an intent to 
confine a different person;203 
(6) (if actually a variety of transferred intent) liability for harm to 
members of the household of the possessor of land caused by a trespass 
on the land.204 
The case law prior to the First Restatement provided little direct support for any 
of this,205 but numerous decisions since publication of the Restatement have adopted 
                                                                                                                 
 
 196. The “black letter” states “imminent apprehension of such a contact.” RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 18, 21 (1965). But obviously what is meant is apprehension of an 
imminent harmful or offensive contact. See id. § 21 cmt. d. 
 197. Id. §§ 216–222. 
 198. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 380 (1934). 
 199. Id. § 162. 
 200. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 162 (1965). Liability to the members of the 
household was not limited to bodily harm, as in the first Restatement. The definition of 
members of the household, see supra text accompanying note 178, was not changed. 
 201. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 13, 16, 18, 20 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§§ 13, 16, 18, 20 (1965). 
 202. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 21, 32 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 21, 
32 (1965). 
 203. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 35, 43 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 35, 
43 (1965). 
 204. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 380 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 162 (1965). 
 205. This was acknowledged by the Reporter for the First Restatement, Francis Bohlen. 
See supra text accompanying notes 132–53 (battery and assault); 158–61 (false 
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or applied the Restatement’s rules on liability for battery and assault.206 There seems 
to be no judicial resistance to adoption of transferred intent as a basis for liability to 
a battery or assault claim.207 It has therefore become established in American tort law 
that a defendant had the intent necessary for liability for battery when the defendant’s 
intent was to commit a battery to a person other than the plaintiff208 or to cause the 
plaintiff to suffer apprehension of an imminent battery rather than a battery itself.209 
Although there are few cases in point, it is also clear that the intent necessary for 
liability in an assault action will be found when the defendant had an intent to commit 
a battery to the plaintiff210 or an intent to put a third person in apprehension.211 
                                                                                                                 
 
imprisonment); 185–91 (trespass to land). 
 206. See case annotations in RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS APPENDIX §§ 13, 16, 18, 
20, 21, 32 (1966 & Supps.) and cases citing treatises incorporating the Restatement’s rules.  
Singer v. Marx, 301 P.2d 440 (Cal. App. 1956); Smith v. Moran, 193 N.E.2d 466 (Ill. App. 
1963); Morrow v. Flores, 225 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). 
 207. As distinct from application of transferred intent when a cause of action for battery or 
assault would have adverse consequences in insurance coverage, application of workers 
compensation law, or the statute of limitations. See infra text accompanying notes 247–58. 
 208. Kraus v. Allstate Insurance Co., 258 F. Supp. 407, 413 (W.D. Pa. 1966), aff’d, 379 
F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1967) (pedestrians injured when man detonated dynamite in car where he 
was meeting his estranged wife); Singer, 301 P.2d at 443 (child threw rock at another child); 
Smith, 193 N.E.2d 466 (defendant fired gun at third person); Baska v. Scherzer, 156 P.3d 617 
(Kan. 2007) (plaintiff struck unintentionally by boys fighting with each other when plaintiff 
attempted to stop fight); Hendrix v. Burns, 43 A.3d 415, 428–30 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2012), 
cert. denied, 50 A.3d 607 (Md. 2012) (can be battery liability on basis of transferred intent, 
but in case there was no evidence of intent to inflict battery on third person); Morrow, 225 
S.W.2d at 623–24 (defendant shot plaintiff while in pursuit of another person). 
 209. Manning v. Grimsley, 643 F.2d 20, 22 (1st Cir. 1981) (baseball pitcher committed 
battery to spectator hit with ball if pitcher threw ball with intent to cause spectators imminent 
apprehension of being hit, because of their continuous heckling); Weisbart v. Flohr, 67 Cal. 
Rptr. 114, 116 (Ct. App. 1968) (seven-year-old liable for battery in hitting another child in 
face with arrow even if he intended only to shoot near her and frighten her); Hall v. McBryde, 
919 P.2d 910 (Colo. App. 1996) (battery liability for wounding occupant of car with gunshot 
because, in firing gun at car to protect his home from car’s occupants, defendant had intent to 
put occupants in apprehension of harmful or offensive bodily contact); Etcher v. Blitch, 381 
So. 2d 1119 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979), cert. denied, 386 So. 2d 636 (Fla. 1980) (assault and 
battery liability for firing gun into car with intent to frighten occupant); Nelson v. Carroll, 735 
A.2d 1096 (Md. 1999) (commission of assault with gun basis of liability for battery when 
plaintiff accidentally shot); Trott v. Merit Dep’t Store, 484 N.Y.S.2d 827 (App. Div. 1985) 
(security guard pursuing plaintiff fired gun at ground as warning shot; bullet hit plaintiff in 
back); Labadie v. Semler, 585 N.E.2d 862 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (intentional tort liability if 
teenager threw snowball with intent to put plaintiff in apprehension of being hit by it); see also 
infra text accompanying notes 212–14 (cases in which the defendant acted with an intent to 
cause such apprehension to a third person). 
 210. Acosta v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 574 F. Supp. 2d 15, 28 (D.D.C. 2008) (firing shots 
at victims). 
 211. Holloway v. Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A., 428 S.E.2d 453, 460–62 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 1993), rev’d in part, 452 S.E.2d 233 (N.C. 1994) (claim of plaintiff who feared being 
shot from gun pointed at someone else). 
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In some cases, liability for an unintended battery has been found by combining 
“transfer” of the intent to affect a person other than the plaintiff and the 
interchangeability of the intent requirements of battery and assault. The most 
prominent cases are Brown v. Martinez212 and Alteiri v. Colasso.213 In Brown, the 
defendant was held liable to the plaintiff when he had fired a rifle in the direction of 
other boys, who were stealing melons from his land, in order to scare them away. In 
Alteiri, the defendant was held liable to a battery action for striking the plaintiff with 
a stone on the jury’s finding that the stone was thrown with an intent to scare some 
other person. The jury had found that the defendant had no intent to strike anyone 
with the stone and had not acted negligently. To find liability for battery in these 
circumstances is squarely within the “black letter” language of the Restatement214 
though possibly beyond what the authors of the First Restatement had in mind. 
There is limited but consistent support in the case law for the proposition that 
there can be liability for false imprisonment when the defendant acted with an intent 
to confine a person other than the plaintiff.215 In Gau v. Smitty’s Super Valu, Inc.,216 
the court quoted from the Restatement’s provisions on false imprisonment217 in 
holding that a four-year-old child had an action against a retail store that confined 
the child when the child’s mother was detained on suspicion of shoplifting. In the 
case law, as well as the Restatement, liability for false imprisonment when the 
defendant intended to confine a third person is the only type of transferred intent that 
operates when the defendant intended or caused confinement. There appears to be no 
support for intentional tort liability when the defendant intended confinement but 
caused something different, or vice versa.218 
With one minor exception, there also appears to be no support in modern case law 
for an intent to commit a trespass to chattels or land to be a basis of liability for 
battery, assault or false imprisonment.219 The exception is Bailey v. County of San 
                                                                                                                 
 
 212. 361 P.2d 152 (N.M. 1961). 
 213. 362 A.2d 798 (Conn. 1975). Manning, 643 F.2d 20, is similar if the plaintiff was not 
one of the hecklers the pitcher intended to suffer apprehension of being struck by the ball. 
 214. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 13, 16 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 13, 
16 (1965). 
 215. Gau v. Smitty’s Super Valu, Inc., 901 P.2d 455 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995); Du Lac v. 
Perma Trans Products, Inc., 163 Cal. Rptr. 335 (Ct. App. 1980); Adams v. Nat’l Bank of 
Detroit, 508 N.W.2d 464, 464–69 (Levin, J.), 474 (Mallett, J.) (Mich. 1993), reh’g denied, 511 
N.W.2d 685 (Mich. 1993). Thomas v. Schwegmann Giant Supermarket, Inc., 561 So. 2d 992 
(La. Ct. App. 1990), which rejected false imprisonment claims on behalf of two small children 
who were with their grandmother when she was detained at a store, did not address whether a 
false imprisonment action could arise when the plaintiff was confined by an act intended to 
confine another person. 
 216. 901 P.2d 455 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1995). 
 217. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 35, 43 (1965). 
 218. See Marcano v. Nw. Chrysler-Plymouth Sales, Inc., 550 F. Supp. 595, 602–03 (N.D. 
Ill. 1982) (intent to confine plaintiff’s car and its contents did not supply element of intent 
required for false imprisonment action). 
 219. See id. at 602–03 (no false imprisonment action when defendant intended to confine 
plaintiff’s car and its contents); Criscuolo v. Grant Cnty., No. 10-CV-0470-TOR, 2014 WL 
527218 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 10, 2014) (no transferred intent that would allow assault action 
because of defendant’s intent to shoot dog); Hall v. McBryde, 919 P.2d 910, 913–14 (Colo. 
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Joaquin,220 in which a federal district court, on a dubious interpretation of state 
law,221 decided that the defendant’s intent to harm a dog when firing a gun 
“transferred to all those who were hit,” giving rise to claims for battery.222 Another 
federal district court has specifically rejected transferred intent as a basis of liability 
for assault when the defendant’s intent was to shoot a dog.223 
There are only a few opinions that consider the Restatement’s extension of 
trespass to land claims to members of the household of the person who possessed the 
land.224 In Keesecker v. G.M. McKelvey Co.,225 a department store’s employee 
entered a house through the doorway of a “sunroom,” to deliver a package that 
actually should have been delivered to the house next door, and left the door open. 
A disabled child living in the house went to the open doorway and tumbled down the 
stairs outside. In an action initiated in the name of the child, the Ohio Court of 
Appeals decided that the employee was a trespasser “as a matter of law” and that the 
child’s injuries were caused by the trespass.226 It then addressed the point that the 
plaintiff was a member of the family of the person in possession of the premises, not 
a “possessory owner.” Quoting Section 380 of the Restatement,227 the court 
concluded that while the common law rule had been that the plaintiff must have been 
in possession of the property on which the trespass was committed, “[t]he law has 
wisely adapted itself to the changing requirements of society, so that today we find 
that the members of a man’s family share with him the right of protection from the 
results of trespass upon the property of the head of the household.”228 
                                                                                                                 
 
App. 1996) (defendant fired shots towards car, wounding one of its occupants; Restatement 
applied so that defendant liable for battery because of intent to commit assault, not intent to 
strike car); Webb v. Jackson, 583 So. 2d 946, 951 (Miss. 1991) (requisite intent for assault and 
battery absent if police officer fired gun to stop dog charging at him); Brabazon v. Joannes 
Bros. Co., 286 N.W. 21, 26 (Wis. 1939) (defendant trespassing on plaintiff’s property not 
liable for assault and battery when no intent to commit that). Cases in which a person was 
accidentally wounded when the defendant was attempting to shoot an animal are usually 
litigated as negligence actions, not as actions for battery. See Metro. Dade Cnty. v. St. Claire, 
445 So. 2d 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (police officer fired at dog); Belk v. Boyce, 138 
S.E.2d 789 (N.C. 1964) (defendant fired at dog); B. Finberg, Annotation, Hunter’s Civil 
Liability for Unintentionally Shooting Another Person, 26 A.L.R.3d 561 (1969). 
 220. 671 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (E.D. Cal. 2009). 
 221. Principally Singer v. Marx, 301 P.2d 440 (Cal. Ct. App. 1956), in which the defendant 
threw a rock at a child, not an animal. 
 222. Bailey, 671 F. Supp. 2d at 1175. 
 223. Criscuolo v. Grant Cnty., No. 10-CV-0470-TOR, 2014 WL 527218 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 
10, 2014). 
 224. RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 380 (1934); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 162 
(1965). 
 225. 27 N.E.2d 787 (Ohio Ct. App. 1940), subsequent proceedings, 42 N.E.2d 223 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1941), rev’d, 47 N.E.2d 211 (Ohio 1943). 
 226. Id. at 789.  
 227. See supra text accompanying notes 177–80. 
 228. Keesecker, 27 N.E.2d at 790. When the case reached the Supreme Court of Ohio, it 
was held that whether the employee was a trespasser was a question for the jury. See 
Keesecker, 47 N.E.2d 211. Justice Hart, in a concurring opinion, decided that the defendant 
would be liable to the child if the child’s injury was the result of a trespass by the defendant’s 
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There are other modern cases in which it was assumed without discussion that a 
child injured by a trespass on the property where the child’s family lived had a 
trespass-based cause of action.229 These, as well as opinions applying the 
Restatement,230 apparently proceed from the Keesecker rationale that family 
members living on residential property with the legal possessor of the property share 
with the possessor legal protection from trespass and thus have a remedy for harm 
caused by trespass.231 There is no element of transferred intent in this basis of 
liability. The defendants’ liability stems from intentionally entering the land where 
the plaintiff resided.232 No reported opinion citing the Restatement goes beyond 
allowing a member of the possessor’s immediate family to recover. Liability for 
harm caused by trespass has not been extended to other persons residing on the land. 
As far as can be ascertained,233 no court has ever endorsed and applied Prosser’s 
claim that a defendant could be liable for any of the five torts stemming from the old 
trespass action when the defendant intended any one of the five. In modern American 
tort law, transferred intent operates only to the extent specified in the First and 
Second Restatements of Torts. 
Prosser’s claim also has no support in the authoritative texts and modern case law 
of England and other common law jurisdictions. To the extent transferred intent 
operates at all in these jurisdictions, it goes no further than liability for assault and 
battery when the defendant intended either and liability for battery when the 
defendant intended to strike someone other than the plaintiff.234 The most recent 
                                                                                                                 
 
employee. Id. at 215–17 (Hart, J., concurring) (quoting RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 380). 
 229. Beavers v. W. Penn Power Co., 436 F.2d 869, 873 (3d Cir. 1971) (child killed by 
contact with power line at edge of parents’ property); Wardrop v. City of Manhattan Beach, 
326 P.2d 15 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958) (child contracted polio from contaminated water pumped 
into yard of family’s home); St. Petersburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cuccinello, 44 So. 2d 
670, 675–77 (Fla. 1950) (child hit by delivery truck). 
 230. In addition to Keesecker, see Smith v. Lenoci, 11 Conn. L. Rptr. 51 (Super. Ct. 1994) 
(child hit by tree falling into parent’s property); Connolley v. Omaha Public Power District, 
177 N.W.2d 492, 496–99 (Neb. 1970) (Spencer J., dissenting) (child injured by contact with 
power line on father’s property). 
 231. See Prosser, supra note 3, at 659. The Second Restatement allows family members 
who live with the possessor of land to maintain an action for a private nuisance that interferes 
with their use and enjoyment of the family home because “members of the family of the 
possessor of a dwelling who occupy it along with him may properly be regarded as sharing 
occupancy with intent to control the land and hence as possessors.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 821E cmt. d (1979). 
 232. Some courts have denied liability for personal injuries resulting from trespass on the 
ground that a trespass action extends only to damage directly resulting from the trespass and 
the plaintiff’s injuries were an indirect consequence of the trespass. Mawson v. Vess Beverage 
Co., 173 S.W.2d 606 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943); Connolley, 177 N.W.2d 492. 
 233. Including by search of opinions citing Prosser in proximity to “transferred intent.” 
 234. See R.P. BALKIN & J.L.R. DAVIS, LAW OF TORTS 32–34 (5th ed. 2013) (Australia); 
GARY CHAN KOK YEW & LEE PEY WOAN, THE LAW OF TORTS IN SINGAPORE 37–38 (2011); 
ALLEN M. LINDEN & BRUCE FELDTHUSEN, CANADIAN TORT LAW 34–35 (9th ed. 2011); 
CHRISTIAN WITTING, STREET ON TORTS 252–54 (14th ed. 2015) (England); EOIN QUILL, TORTS 
IN IRELAND 168–69 (4th ed. 2014). In these jurisdictions, unlike the United States, trespass to 
the person survives as a tort, and it has not been authoritatively established that a trespass 
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English case on transferred intent, Bici v. Ministry of Defence,235 accepted it as a 
basis of liability only when the plaintiff was struck by a force intended to apply to 
another person.236 There is no indication that a court in England or elsewhere would 
require intent for liability but decide that the intent requirement would be fulfilled by 
a type of transferred intent not accepted in the Restatements. 
VI. EXPANSIVE TRANSFERRED INTENT LIABILITY SHOULD BE REJECTED 
Would it be desirable to hold people liable for battery, assault, false 
imprisonment, trespass to chattels, or trespass to land when they have intended any 
result within the five torts? Even with recognition that transferred intent liability has 
so far been limited to battery, assault, and (for unintended confinees) false 
imprisonment, Prosser’s theory of transferred intent might be adopted if it were 
thought that this would have desirable results. But transferred intent liability can be 
strongly criticized on a number of grounds, even in its application to battery and 
assault.237 
The fundamental objection to transferred intent—one that Prosser made no 
attempt to refute—is, of course, that transferred intent subjects people to intentional 
tort liability when they had no intent to cause what happened to the plaintiff.238 This 
criticism has the strongest force when the defendant did not intend a result of the 
type that occurred, even under a broad concept of “type” or category of legally 
protected interests—as when the defendant had an intent to interfere only with some 
property interest (land or chattels) but unintentionally caused personal injury or 
apprehension of being injured. The interchangeability of the intent requirements of 
battery and assault may be justified on account of the closely related interests that 
these torts pertain to and the likelihood that apprehension of imminent battery will 
result from an act intended to cause a battery;239 but trespass to land, trespass to 
                                                                                                                 
 
action now requires intent to cause contact with the plaintiff’s person (for trespass to the 
person) or property (for trespass to land or chattels). A defendant may be held liable because 
the injury was a direct result of the defendant’s act and the act was negligent or at least reckless. 
Consequently, a rule of transferred intent is not needed to hold a defendant liable for an 
unintentional injury. See BALKIN & DAVIS, supra, at 32–34, 118; KIT BARKER, PETER CANE, 
MARK LUNNEY & FRANCIS TRINDADE, THE LAW OF TORTS IN AUSTRALIA 37–41 (5th ed. 2012); 
MICHAEL A. JONES, CLERK & LINDSELL ON TORTS 1092–93 (21st ed. 2014); LINDEN & 
FELDTHUSEN, supra, at 279–83; EDWIN PEEL & JAMES GOUDKAMP, WINFIELD AND JOLOWICZ 
ON TORT 50–51, 56–57 (19th ed. 2014). In the older English cases of trespass, clearly no intent 
to cause any particular consequence was required for liability. See supra text accompanying 
Part II. 
 235. [2004] EWHC 786 (QB) (Eng.). 
 236. Id. at [66]–[72]. The judge rejected a claim of assault, id. at [73]–[81], saying that he 
was “far from satisfied that the doctrine of transferred malice would apply to an assault in the 
same way as it applies to a battery.” Id. at [80]. He also doubted that transferred malice would 
apply when the defendant aimed at an animal and hit a person. Id. at [69]. 
 237. The principal critical examinations are those of Beever, supra note 5, and Johnson, 
supra note 1. 
 238. See Hurd & Moore, supra note 28, at 389–90; Johnson, supra note 1, at 937 (both 
advocating abolition of transferred intent). 
 239. See TORTS TREATISE NO. 1(a) SUPPORTING RESTATEMENT NO. 1, at 32–33 (1925) 
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chattels, and intentional torts to the person (battery, assault, and false imprisonment) 
involve fundamentally different interests (respectively, control and use of land, 
control and use of chattels, and bodily integrity and dignity),240 their rules of liability 
are different, and there is no likelihood that an act intended to cause only physical 
contact with property will cause physical interference with a person, or that an act 
intended to cause only physical interference with a person will cause an invasion of 
property interests.241 
Transferred intent is objectionable also because it creates liability in the absence 
of negligence or actual injury to the plaintiff’s person or property. There would 
usually be liability without transferred intent if the defendant caused actual injury 
and was shown to have acted negligently. There is no great need for liability when 
there is no actual injury, and it seems anomalous and unjust to impose liability when 
the defendant was not negligent or conducting an activity subject to strict liability. A 
person who is not negligent should not be held liable for battery or assault because 
the person aimed at an animal or inanimate property,242 or for trespass to property 
because of an intent to commit a tortious interference with a person. Acting with such 
an intent is not in itself such culpable conduct as to warrant liability for any injury 
that results.243 
In the reported cases, the main instances in which a defendant was held liable for 
injury because of transferred intent although not liable on the basis of negligence 
have involved children who threw an object or shot an arrow without intending to 
strike the person who was injured.244 Being able to hold a child liable for an 
intentional tort when the child had no intent to strike the plaintiff is hardly a 
persuasive argument for transferred intent.245 But even if there is some justification 
                                                                                                                 
 
(quoted supra text accompanying note 133); DOBBS ET AL., supra note 14, at 118–19. 
 240. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 110 cmts. b 
& c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015). 
 241. Because intent is defined to include knowledge that a consequence is substantially 
certain to result, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965), there would be liability 
without transferred intent if the defendant knew that the defendant’s act would cause a result 
within one of the five torts, even when the defendant’s purpose was to cause a different type 
of result. For example, there would be liability for trespass to land or chattels when the 
defendant acted with a purpose to harm a person but knew that property would be harmed by 
the defendant’s act. Cf. Sebok, supra note 15, at 1176 (example of battery when defendant 
acted with purpose of burning house and knowledge that person inside house would die). 
 242. There should not be liability for battery or assault when the defendant’s intent was 
merely to handle property or enter land, especially if the defendant mistakenly believed he had 
a right to do so. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 14, at 117; James Gordley, The Common Law 
in the Twentieth Century: Some Unfinished Business, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1815, 1845–47 (2000). 
 243. See Beever, supra note 5, at 408–10 (policy arguments support liability for 
consequences when conduct falls below a standard of care, not transferred intent); Johnson, 
supra note 1, at 931–33. 
 244. See Weisbart v. Flohr, 67 Cal. Rptr. 114 (Ct. App. 1968); Singer v. Marx, 301 P.2d 
440 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1956); Alteiri v. Colasso, 362 A.2d 798 (Conn. 1975). 
 245. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 925. Under Prosser’s theory, Brian Dailey, the 
five-year-old defendant in Garratt v. Dailey, 279 P.2d 1091 (Wash. 1955), would be liable for 
battery because he intended to move the chair in which the plaintiff was about to sit (trespass 
to chattels), even if he had no intent to cause the plaintiff to fall and hit the ground. See 
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for allowing a battery claim and not requiring proof of negligence when the defendant 
acted with an intent to strike or frighten a person, this does not support allowing a 
battery action when the defendant had no intent to affect any person in this way. If 
there is no cause of action in negligence against the defendant because harm to the 
plaintiff was beyond the foreseeable risks or entirely unforeseeable, the defendant 
should not be held liable nevertheless by extending transferred intent beyond battery 
and assault.246 An intent to enter or physically interfere with the plaintiff’s property 
should be an indispensable requirement of liability for trespass to land or chattels, 
and an intent to interfere with a person should be an indispensable requirement of 
liability for intentional torts to the person. 
From a practical perspective, transferred intent is undesirable because of 
consequences that flow from a decision that there is intentional tort liability, 
especially when the plaintiff would otherwise have a viable negligence action.247 The 
consequences include disadvantages for plaintiffs as well as for defendants. There 
are decisions that the plaintiff’s action is time-barred because the applicable 
limitation is the time allowed for battery actions rather than the longer time allowed 
for negligence actions.248 There are also decisions that the defendant’s liability is not 
covered by insurance because there was an intentional tort.249 It might be more 
difficult to establish vicarious liability if there is an intentional tort,250 and an action 
against a government entity may be barred when the government is immune from 
liability for an intentional tort.251 An injury claim against an employer might come 
under an exception for intentional injuries in the state’s workers compensation 
law.252 If the defendant is liable for an intentional tort, contributory negligence is not 
                                                                                                                 
 
Gordley, supra note 242, at 1843–45. 
 246. See Beever, supra note 5, at 409–10. 
 247. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS, at 2–15 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015) (discussing consequences of finding an intentional tort 
generally); Johnson, supra note 1, at 916–27. 
 248. Baska v. Scherzer, 156 P.3d 617 (Kan. 2007); Trott v. Merit Dep’t Store, 484 
N.Y.S.2d 827 (App. Div. 1985). Cf. Alteiri v. Colasso, 362 A.2d 798 (Conn. 1975) (action not 
time-barred, when limitation period longer for intentional tort action than for negligence 
action). 
 249. Hermitage Ins. Co. v. Sportsmen’s Athletic Club, 578 F. Supp. 2d 399 (D. Conn. 
2008) (victims shot by nightclub patron who aimed at other person); Kraus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
258 F. Supp. 407 (W.D. Pa. 1966), aff’d, 379 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1967) (pedestrians injured 
when man intentionally detonated dynamite in car in which man was meeting estranged wife); 
Eady v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 502 S.E.2d 514 (Ga. App. 1998) (bystanders shot during 
confrontation in bar); Everhart v. Founders Ins. Co., 993 N.E.2d 1170 (Ind. App. 2013) 
(bartender shoved patron; patron stumbled and grabbed plaintiff as he fell); Norman v. Ins. 
Co. of N. Am., 239 S.E.2d 902 (Va. 1978) (during argument, defendant fired pistol at floor; 
bullet ricocheted and hit plaintiff). Cf. Farm Bureau Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hammer, 177 F.2d 
793 (4th Cir. 1949), cert. denied sub nom. Beverage v. Farm Bureau Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 
339 U.S. 914 (1950) (car passengers injured when truck driver intentionally caused collision 
between truck and car). 
 250. See Johnson, supra note 1, at 920–21. 
 251. Id. at 924–25. 
 252. See Citizen v. Theodore Daigle & Brother, Inc., 418 So. 2d 598, 603–04 (La. 1982) 
(Watson J., dissenting) (battery because of intent to assault); Gray v. Morley, 596 N.W.2d 922, 
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a defense.253 The limitations of “proximate cause” would not apply, so there could 
be liability for remote or unforeseeable consequences that would not be imposed if 
the basis of the defendant’s liability were negligence.254 The judgment debt may not 
be dischargeable in bankruptcy.255 These consequences are not inevitable. A court 
might, for example, decide that an injury was not intentionally caused for purposes 
of liability insurance coverage256 or workers compensation257 when the basis of 
intentional tort liability was transferred intent rather than intent to cause the injury 
that occurred.258 But they are sufficiently likely to warrant resistance to transferred 
intent operating as projected by Prosser. 
When the plaintiff suffered the type of consequence intended by the defendant but 
was not the person intended to suffer it, transferred intent liability is less 
objectionable than when the defendant did not intend the type of consequence that 
occurred. Arguably a defendant deserves to be held liable (absent a defense) when 
the defendant intended to cause the type of harm that was suffered by the plaintiff, 
                                                                                                                 
 
927 n.3 (Mich. 1999) (Kelly J., dissenting) (battery because of intentional assault). This would 
be disadvantageous to the plaintiff if the plaintiff wanted workers compensation but not if the 
plaintiff wanted to maintain a tort action, as in Gray v. Morley. 
 253. Labadie v. Semler, 585 N.E.2d 862 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (plaintiff hit and injured by 
snowball; no contributory negligence defense because snowball thrown with at least intent to 
put plaintiff in apprehension of being hit). But see City of Winter Haven v. Allen, 541 So. 2d 
128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), review denied, 548 So. 2d 662 (Fla. 1989) (sheriff’s deputy shot by 
police officer during drug raid; if police officer’s action justifiable, there was “no wrongful 
intent to be transferred” and comparative negligence could apply). 
 254. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIABILITY FOR PHYSICAL AND EMOTIONAL 
HARM § 33 cmts. c–e (2010); JOHN L. DIAMOND, LAWRENCE C. LEVINE & ANITA BERNSTEIN, 
UNDERSTANDING TORTS 5, 8 (5th ed. 2013); Atrens, supra note 15, at 401–06; Reynolds, supra 
note 4, at 531. 
 255. In re White, 18 B.R. 246 (E.D. Va. 1982) (bankrupt shot at motorcyclist and hit 
bystander). See Johnson, supra note 1, at 926–27. 
 256.  Allstate Ins. Co. v. Lewis, 732 F. Supp. 1112 (D. Colo. 1990) (teenager aimed gun at 
victim and pulled trigger, believing gun to be empty); American Ins. Co. v. Saulnier, 242 F. 
Supp. 257 (D. Conn. 1965) (13-year-old threw soda bottle at child, possibly with intent to 
strike child; bottle hit different child); Vanguard Ins. Co. v. Cantrell, 503 P.2d 962 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 1972) (gun fired with intent to frighten but not strike victim); Farmers Ins. Grp. v. 
Sessions, 607 P.2d 422 (Idaho 1980) (dissatisfied patron threw bar stool at restaurant manager 
but hit another employee); Smith v. Moran, 209 N.E.2d 18 (Ill. App. Ct. 1965) (victim shot 
when insured fired gun with intent to shoot someone else); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 322 
N.E.2d 693 (Ohio Ct. App. 1974) (motorist struck pedestrian while attempting to run down 
others). 
 257. Citizen v. Theodore Daigle & Brother, Inc., 418 So. 2d 598 (La. 1982) (to frighten 
coworker as practical joke, employee aimed rifle at coworker and fired, erroneously believing 
that rifle was not loaded); Rivera v. Safford, 377 N.W.2d 187 (Wis. Ct. App. 1985), review 
denied, 383 N.W.2d 64 (Wis. 1986) (police officer swung at suspect; hit another officer in 
face). 
 258. Concerning the statute of limitations, see Gottfried v. Joseph, No. 1-87-12, 1988 WL 
38099 (Ohio Ct. App. April 21, 1988). Plaintiff, accidentally injured during a fight in a bar, 
filed a complaint after expiry of the statute of limitations for assault and battery. The court 
held that the existence of assault and battery because of transferred intent did not preclude an 
action based on negligence. 
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even if the defendant did not intend harm to the plaintiff personally.259 Application 
of transferred intent might be accepted in cases involving property that are closely 
analogous to the cases of defendants held liable on grounds of battery for striking the 
plaintiff when intending to strike someone else. There could, for example, be liability 
for trespass to chattels when the defendant destroyed the plaintiff’s airplane with 
explosives when intending to destroy a different airplane, or intentionally fired a gun 
into a pack of dogs without an intent to kill the plaintiff’s dog specifically. Also, 
although it does involve an unintended type of harm, holding a defendant liable for 
battery in the unlikely scenario of harmful bodily contact resulting from an act 
intended to confine the plaintiff,260 or for false imprisonment in the even more 
unlikely scenario of unintended confinement resulting from an act intended to cause 
harmful or offensive bodily contact, might be accepted because battery and false 
imprisonment are both infringements of bodily freedom and dignity.261 But any 
acceptance of transferred intent beyond what is endorsed in the Restatements, 
however limited, is likely to lead to further expansion of transferred intent liability. 
Unqualified limitation of transferred intent to battery, assault, and (when there was 
intent to confine a different person) false imprisonment is preferable. If a person 
really should be held liable for harm caused, when different from the harm or 
wrongful interference intended, a cause of action for negligence will almost always 
be available. 
CONCLUSION 
Prosser asserted that a defendant would be liable on the basis of transferred intent 
for any of the five torts descended from the common law trespass action—battery, 
assault, false imprisonment, trespass to chattels, and trespass to land—when the 
defendant intended to cause a result within any of the five. However, this has never 
been the law. In English common law and older American tort law, liability for these 
torts did not require intent to cause a specified consequence, so no doctrine of 
transferred intent was needed in order to hold a defendant liable. In modern American 
tort law, intent to cause a certain consequence is a requirement of liability, and there 
has been acceptance of some liability based on transferred intent. But this has not 
gone beyond the acceptance of transferred intent in the First and Second 
Restatements of Torts, which is limited to battery, assault, and (for plaintiffs other 
                                                                                                                 
 
 259. See DOBBS ET AL., supra note 14, at 118. But see Beever, supra note 5, at 405–08 
(contending that to disregard the identity of the person harmed would be fundamentally 
inconsistent with “the most basic and obvious structural features of the law of tort,” which 
creates a cause of action because of a personal wrong to the plaintiff and which allows only 
the victim of a tort to bring suit because of its commission, unlike criminal law). 
 260. An example would be accidentally slamming a room door on the plaintiff’s hand when 
the plaintiff was to be locked in the room. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK & 
BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW: RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 635 (3d ed. 2012). If the 
intended confinement occurred and caused bodily harm, this would be consequential damage 
to be remedied in a false imprisonment action. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 42 
cmt. b (1965); KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 48. 
 261. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 110 cmts. b 
& c (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015). 
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than the person the defendant intended to confine) false imprisonment.262 Transferred 
intent does not operate between torts to the person and property torts or within the 
property torts. 
It is curious that Prosser reached the conclusions he did. Undoubtedly he saw 
patterns in the results of the cases, with defendants held liable to people they did not 
intend to injure for torts the defendants did not intend to commit or types of damage 
they did not intend to cause. But most of the cases he discussed or cited were decided 
before intent in the modern sense was required for liability, or cases of liability for 
the unintended consequences of trespass to land. Prosser also had little to say in favor 
of transferred intent on its merits. He called it a “curious survival of the antique 
law”263 and an “arrant, bare-faced fiction of the kind dear to the heart of the medieval 
pleader.”264 Prosser’s only defense of transferred intent liability was that there was 
“some merit in the old idea of the absolute wrong,”265 with the defendant required to 
pay for the damage caused, if it was within the scope of the trespass action and 
directly caused. He gave the example of a plaintiff struck by a bullet intended for 
someone else, but none involving a property tort. 
Prosser’s claim about transferred intent is mentioned in a number of torts treatises 
and casebooks,266 but only one267 presents Prosser’s position as if it were the law 
today. The editors of the posthumous edition of Prosser’s Law of Torts considered it 
necessary to change the text to state that possibly transferred intent would apply 
beyond battery and assault to include false imprisonment, so the defendant would be 
liable for any of the three when the defendant intended any of the three.268 The 
previous edition’s references to trespass to chattels and trespass to land269 were 
deleted. 
There was not much authority recognizing transferred intent when the First 
Restatement was written, even for battery and assault.270 The Reporter, Francis 
Bohlen, was aware of this.271 As Reporter for the Second Restatement, Prosser might, 
                                                                                                                 
 
 262. Interpreting the Restatement’s position on trespass to land as recognition that family 
members of the household share occupancy with the land’s possessor, not as acceptance of 
transferred intent liability when the defendant trespassed on land belonging to a third party. 
See supra text accompanying notes 177–93, 224–32. 
 263. Prosser, supra note 3, at 650. 
 264. Id. 
 265. Id. at 661. 
 266. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 254, at 4; DOBBS ET AL., supra note 14, at 116; GOLDBERG 
ET AL., supra note 260, at 636; VINCENT R. JOHNSON, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 54 (5th 
ed. 2013); LINDEN & FELDTHUSEN, supra note 234, at 35; SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 125, 
at 31; DAVID WEISSBRODT, MARY PATRICIA BYRN & DONALD MARSHALL, THE COMMON LAW 
PROCESS OF TORTS 63 (2d ed. 2012). 
 267. DIAMOND ET AL., supra note 254, at 4. 
 268. KEETON ET AL., supra note 2, at 38. 
 269. PROSSER, supra note 2, at 33. 
 270. So far as can be determined, transferred intent was not mentioned in any reported tort 
case until Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928), rearg. denied, 164 
N.E. 564 (N.Y. 1928), and then only to contrast it with negligence liability. Id. at 101. The 
author of the opinion, Chief Judge Cardozo, was an Adviser for the Restatement of Torts and 
thus familiar with the inclusion of transferred intent in drafts of the Restatement. 
 271. See supra note 205. 
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despite the absence of solid precedent for it, have attempted to expand transferred 
intent in the Restatement to include trespass to chattels, trespass to land, and false 
imprisonment generally; but there is no indication that he ever did so. It is likely that 
the Third Restatement will maintain the position on transferred intent adopted by its 
predecessors.272 The Restatements have consistently excluded liability for one of the 
torts to the person because of an intent to commit one of the torts to property and 
vice versa. 
While acting with an intent to cause physical interference with a person or 
property, absent a legal right to do so, is legally wrongful conduct, it is not so 
wrongful as to warrant liability for unintended consequences as a general rule. If 
transferred intent liability is justified at all, it is only when the type of harm caused 
is the same as or at least closely associated with the type of harm intended and vital 
interests may warrant a per se rule of liability, as when the defendant intended a 
battery to A and caused a harmful or offensive bodily contact to B, or caused A to be 
put in apprehension of the intended battery. Otherwise, any liability for an 
unintended result of the defendant’s act should be grounded in negligence or strict 
liability. An intentional tort should not be found when in reality there was no intent 
to cause what happened. 
Prosser’s treatise and articles on tort law have such authority that there is always 
a possibility that anything he wrote may be accepted by a judge or legal author. But 
no court has adopted or applied Prosser’s position on transferred intent in a reported 
case. When D accidentally hits P while throwing a rock at a tree belonging to P or a 
third party, it is not battery. It is not assault if P is unintentionally put in apprehension 
of being hit by the rock, or trespass to chattels if P’s car or cat is accidentally hit. 
Prosser’s description of transferred intent was not the law when he incorporated it 
into his Transferred Intent article and treatise, it is not the law now, and it should not 
become the law. 
 
                                                                                                                 
 
 272. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: INTENTIONAL TORTS TO PERSONS § 110 
(Tentative Draft No. 1, 2015).  
